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STATE ATTEMPTS TO TAX SALES OF GOLD 
COIN AND BULLION IN THE UNITED 
STATES: THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
IMPLICATIONS 
by Neal S. Solomon* 
and Linda D. Headley** 
I. INTRODUCTION 
When the U.S. Congress, in 1974, legalized private ownership of gold coin and 
bullion I after forty years of prohibition, Congress did not state whether it 
intended to permit the states to tax gold coin2 and bullion3 sales and purchases. 4 
Although at least one state has declined this new opportunity for tax revenue,5 
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I. Act of Aug. 14, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-373, § 2, 88 Stat. 445 (repealing 31 U.S.C. § 443 (1976)) (Act 
prohibits the acquisition and use of gold in violation of law). 
2. Gold bullion coins are marked with the imprint of a sovereign nation, and include the Krugerrand 
of the Republic of South Africa, the Maple Leaf of Canada, the Gold Corona of Austria. the Gold Peso 
of Mexico. the Gold Sovereign of Great Britain, and the Gold Bars of the Credit Bank of Switzerland. 
American Arts Gold Medallions issued by the U.S. Government under Act of Nov. 10. 1978, Pub. L. No. 
95-630,92 Stat. 3679, are not legal tender in the United States. A full-page advertisement for Mexico's 
gold pesos that appeared in the New York Times Magazine on December 13. 1981 states that the coins are 
legal tender "supported by the Central Bank of Mexico, Banco de Mexico, which guarantees full 
redemption at a price based on the current market value of gold." See N.Y. Times, Dec. 13, 1981. § 6 
(Magazine). at 135. 
3. Gold bullion is sold in the form of coins or medallions or in ingots of recognizable form, weight 
and fineness made by government agencies, such as Swiss Bank ingots, or by private manufacturers, 
such as Engelhard. See, e.g., MERRILL LYNCH. PIERCE, FENNER & SMITH, GOLD AND SILVER: PRECIOUS 
METAL OPPORTUNITIES AT MERRILL LYNCH 2 (1981) [hereinafter cited as PRECIOUS OPPORTUNITIES]. 
4. President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, on March 10, 1933, ordered that all persons in the United 
States holding gold surrender it to the U.S. government in exchange for paper currency. Executive 
Order No. 6073 (March 10, 1933). Act of Aug. 14, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-373, 88 Stat. 445. signed by 
President Gerald Ford on August 15, 1974, permitted private ownership of gold in the United States 
after December 31, 1974. See J. COCHRAN, MONEY, BANKING AND THE ECONOMY 48 (3d ed. 1975) 
[hereinafter cited as COCHRAN]. 
5. Section 6355 of the California Revenue and Taxation Code: (I) exempts "gross receipts from the 
sales in bulk of monetized bullion which are substantially equivalent to transactions in securities or 
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and the courts of another state have ordered it not to tax gold coin and bullion 
sales,6 other states want to share in the "gold boom" bonanza of the late 1970's by 
taxing these transactions.7 
The U.S. Constitution grants the U.S. government exclusive authority to coin 
and regulate the value of money.s The Constitution prohibits the states from 
issuing paper currency or making anything but gold and silver legal tender. 9 
The Framers of the Constitution wanted to assure uniformity of the value of the 
nation's money by giving control over all money in the United States, domestic 
and foreign, to the U.S. government. 10 The Framers wanted to avoid the prob-
lems that the federation had experienced before the Constitution when each 
state issued its own money and made its own laws for foreign coins circulated 
within its bordersY 
The U.S. Congress made gold and silver coin the foundation of American 
money until the twentieth century. 12 Although Congress authorized the issuance 
commodities through a national securities or commodities exchange and the storage, use or other 
consumption in this state of monetized bullion as sold," CAL. REv. & TAX CoDE § 6355 (West 1973 & 
Supp. 1980); (2) defines "sales in bulk" as a transaction that "totals, in face amount, the sum of one 
thousand dollars ($1,000) or more, or its equivalent," ill. and, (3) defines "monetized bullion" as "coins 
or other forms of money manufactured of gold, silver, or other metal and heretofore, now, or 
h':reafter used as a medium of exchange under the laws of this state, the United States, or any foreign 
nation." [d. This exemption applies to Mexican gold pesos, Austrian gold coronas, and other "real 
money coins, not :private-minted tokens or medallions." Alan Van Vliet Enterprises, Inc. v. California 
State Board of Equalization, 135 Cal. Rptr. 716, 717, 65 Cal. 3d 964, 965 (1977). 
6. An appellate court in the State of Florida found that the Krugerrand is an official coin of the 
Republic of South Africa, and for that reason could not be determined to be "tangible property" subject 
10 Ihe slale', sales lax. Smilh v. Dep!. of Revenue, 376 So. 2d 421 (Fla. Dis!. Ct. App. 1979). 
7. New Jersey has taken the position that under the New Jersey Sales and Use Tax Act, gold and 
silver bullion and coins, the value of which is determined by metal content, is taxable as tangible 
personal property. Armstrong v. Director, Div. of Taxation, No. ST 253A-81, at 7-8 (T.C.N.]. Feb. 19, 
1981) (stipulation of facts). See N.J. STAT. ANN. 54:32 B-8 (West 1960). . 
New York imposes sales tax on the same items under N.Y. Tax Law § 1I05(a). New York has taken 
the position that a coin, such as a rare coin or commemorative coin, which is legal tender, but is either 
nOI in general circulation, or is purchased at a rate not reflecting actual currency value or at a value 
determined by the precious metal content of the coin, is to be deemed purchased for numismatics, coin 
n)llccting or investment purposes and is a sale of tangible personal property subject to sales tax. 2 N.Y. 
Stalt Tax Rep. (CCH) ~ 65-174. 
In the Tax Reform Code of 1971, Act of Mar. 4,1971, No.2, Pennsylvania imposes a sales and use tax 
IIl1der Article II, Tax for Education. Pennsylvania has taken the position that gold or silver bullion is not 
a form of legal tender and is tangible personal property subject to tax. 2 Penn. State Tax Rep. (CCH) 
~ 60- 101.40. 
ll. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 5. 
9. [d. art. J, § 10, cl. I. 
10. THE FElJERALlS'I No. 42, al 285 (j. Madison) (j. Cooke ed. 1961). See generally P. STUDENSKI & 
H, KROOSS, FI"A"CIAI. HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 33-44 (2d ed., 1963) [hereinalter cited as 
STUDENSKI & KROOSS]; COCHRAN, supra note 4, at 38-40. 
II. COCHRAN, supra note 4, at 38-40. See generally G. DUNNE, MONETARV DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME 
COl'Rr 3-16 (1960) [hereinafter cited as DUNNE]. 
12. See COCHRAN, supra note 4, at 38-48. 
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of paper money in order to finance the Civil War and Reconstruction, Congress 
intended this measure to be temporary. The government eventually redeemed 
all of this paper moneyY Although Congress, the Supreme Court and presi-
dents in the twentieth century have affirmed many times by their actions the 
power of the U.S. government to control and regulate gold and silver coin and 
bullion, the question of state taxation remains unanswered. 14 To what extent, if 
any, has the U.S. government, by permitting private ownership of gold coin and 
bullion since December 31, 1974, granted to the states the power to enact 
various taxes on coin and bullion? 
States that want to assess sales tax on gold transactions may assume that the 
U.S. government "demonetized" gold when Congress ended the convertibility of 
dollars into gold. 15 Whereas states could not tax gold when gold was officially 
legal tender, these states may contend that the gold in circulation in the United 
States today, even foreign gold coins, is a tangible commodity, transactions in 
which the states may tax. 16 An alternative point of view asserts that ownership of 
gold coin and bullion in the United States is a "privilege" allowed by the federal 
government. 17 According to this view, the U.S. government's lifting of the ban 
on private ownership of gold coin and bullion as part of the plan for interna-
tional monetary reform does not mean that gold coins and bullion are not money 
or that the various states may now make a distinction between gold coins and 
other coins. 
Although Congress returned the privileges to own gold to Americans, it may 
revoke that privilege. The laws and Supreme Court decisions which supported 
confiscation of gold coin and bullion by the U.S. government during the Great 
Depression are still effective. IS Much of the gold that currently circulates in this 
13. See STUDENSKI & KROOSS, supra note 10, at 145-46. 
14. See § II.B.3 infra. 
15. Congress set the gold certificate requirement of25% backing for Federal Reserve notes in March 
1968. This action placed the entire U.S. gold stock behind American dollar liabilities to foreigners. 
COCHRAN, supra note 4, at 50,431. The United States closed the gold window to foreign nations on 
August 15, 1971.Id. at 50. See also R. SoLOMON, THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM 1945·1976: AN 
INSIDER'S VIEW 109, 119 (1977) [hereinafter cited as SoLOMON]. 
On March 14, 1968, the U.S. Senate approved an amendment to the Gold Reserve Act which 
repealed the requirement that 25% of the nation's currency in circulation be backed by gold. When 
PresidentJohnson signed the bill a few days later, Act of Mar. 18, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-269, § 8, 82 Stat. 
50 (codified at 31 U.S.C. § 408a (1976», all of the stock of gold held by the United States - about 11.5 
billion dollars' worth - became available to maintain the parity of the dollar under the IMF Articles of 
Agreement. See gemraUy A. LOWENFELD, THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM 99 ed. note (1977) 
[hereinafter cited as LOWENFELD]. On August 15, 1971, President Nixon announced that the United 
States would no longer convert foreign-held dollars into gold or other reserve assets. Address of 
President Nixon, 7 WEEKLY COMPo PREs. Doc. 1170 (Aug. 15, 1971). 
16. See note 7 supra. 
17. See Holzer, Private Gold Ownership: Right Versus Privilege, 92 BANKING L. J. 334, 340-46 (1975) 
[hereinafter cited as Holzer]. 
18. E.g., Trading With The Enemy Act, ch. 106, § 5(b), 40 Stat. 415 (1917) (codified at 12 U.S.C. 
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(ountry is in the form of coins issued by foreign nations or their central banks. t9 
The U.S. Gold Commission20 is studying the possibility of issuing new U.S. gold 
coins to compete with these foreign issues. 2t The United States also is reportedly 
considering a return to the gold standard, which could require redemption of 
privately owned gold by the U.S. government. 22 These factors, and the existence 
of specific federal tariff items for "metal coins" and "bullion,"23 tend to show that 
gold coin and bullion in this country are subject to the exclusive uniform 
regulation of the federal government. 
This article addresses three issues: (1) whether the various states in the United 
States may impose a tax on sales of the Krugerrand and other gold coins that are 
declared to be legal tender by official act in their respective countries of origin; 
(2) whether the states may impose a tax on sales of gold coins that bear the 
imprint of a sovereign nation but that are not declared to be legal tender by 
official act in their respective countries; and (3) whether the states may impose a 
tax on sales of gold bullion. 
The article points out that "foreign coin" is subject to uniform federal regula-
tion under the U.S. Constitution, and concludes that foreign gold coins, like the 
Krugerrand, fall within the Constitution's meaning of "foreign coin." Thus, 
states cannot claim that these coins are "tangible" personal property for certain 
purposes. The article asserts that the same result should apply to non-legal 
tender foreign coins and gold bullion. The article then outlines how the U.S. 
government has controlled private gold ownership from the birth of the United 
States to the present under its broad constitutional power to coin and regulate 
the value of money, and concludes that such coins and bullion also are subject to 
uniform federal authority. 
§ 95(a) (1976». Proclamation No. 2039, 31 C.F.R. 340 (1982), reprinted in 48 Stat. 1689 (1933), and in II 
THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, THE YEAR OF CRISIS 24-29 (1938); 
Emergency Banking Relief Act, ch. I, § 3, 48 Stat. I (1933) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 956 and 50 U.S.C. 
app. § 5 note (1933»; Executive Order No. 6073, 31 C.F.R. 341 (1982); Gold Reserve Act ofl934, ch. 6, 
§ 2(3),48 Stat. 337 (1934) (codified at 31 U.S.C. §§ 441, 490 (1976»; Norman v. Baltimore & O.R.Co., 294 
U.S. 240 (1935); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819); Nortz v. United States, 294 U.S. 
317 (1935); Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330 (1935). See § II.B.3.b infra for a discussion of the above 
cases. For a summary of U.S. laws enacted during the Great Depression, which led to abandonment of 
the gold standard, see generally STUDENSKI & KROOSS, supra note 10, at 382-402; M. FRIEDMAN & A. 
SCHWARTZ, A MONETARY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: 1867-1960, at 462-83 (1963) [hereinafter 
cited as FRIEDMAN & SCHWARTZ]. 
19. See Maidenberg. Gold, Through Thick and Thin, N.Y. Times, Feb. I, 1981, § III, at 13, col. I. See 
PRECIOUS OPPORTUNITIES, supra note 2. 
20. 31 U.s.C. § 822a note (1980). See Agency Favors U.S. Gold Coin, N.Y. Times,Jan. 9,1982, at 39, col. 
6. Congress established the U.S. Gold Commission to "conduct a study to assess and make recommenda-
tions with regard to the policy of the United States Government concerning the role of gold in [the] 
domestic and international monetary systems." Act of Oct. 7, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-389, § 10,94 Stat. 
1555. 
21. Agency Favors U.S. Gold Coin, N.Y. Times, Jan. 9, 1981, at 39, col. 5. 
22. [d. 
23. See Tariff Schedules of the United States (TSUS), 19 U.S.C. § 1202, items 653.22 & 605.20. 
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Following this discussion, the current role of gold coin and bullion in interna-
tional affairs is examined. The article then analyzes whether state sales taxes on 
gold coin and bullion transactions would infringe on the power of the U.S. 
government to conduct foreign commerce, concluding that such taxation would 
be an infringement on this power. Finally, the article analyzes whether a state 
sales tax of gold coin and bullion would violate the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT)24 to which the United States subscribes and asserts 
that states which attempt to collect sales tax on certain foreign gold coin or 
bullion but not on similar issues by other nations violate the U.S. commitment to 
the GATT. 
II. FEDERAL POWER TO CONTROL MONEY 
A. Constitutional Power to Control and Regulate the Nation's Monetary Affairs 
1. Pre-Constitution 
When the Founding Fathers drafted the U.S. Constitution, they included lillie 
detail with respect to money. The provisions they did include give control over 
money to the federal government and forbids interference by the states. The 
Constitution grants Congress the power to "coin money, regulate the value 
thereof, and [regulate the value] of foreign coin."25 The Constitution forbids the 
states to "coin money" or "emit bills of credit."26 Through these provisions, the 
Constitution's signers intended to give control over the nation's money supply to 
the federal government. 27 "[T]he Constitution," James Willard Hurst, the legal 
historian, has written, "determined that ultimate control of the money supply 
24. See § IV infra. 
25. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, d. 5. 
26. Id. art. I, § 10, d. 1. Since metallic money was scarce and commodity money was unsatisfactory, the 
early American colonists began to issue three types of paper money: bills of credit issued by the 
legislatures, bank notes issued by publicly-owned banks, and bank notes issued by private banks. Bills of 
credit were a cross between short-term notes issued in anticipation of tax collection and outright flat 
money. Since the government used bills of credit to pay expenses, these bills were a form of borrowing 
which set a precedent for the issuance of non-interest-bearing "continentals" during the Revolution and 
of "treasury notes" during the War of 1812 and Civil War. Massachusetts issued the first bills of credit in 
1690 to pay soldiers returning from the campaign against Quebec. Massachusetts intended to redeem 
the bills from taxes, but since the colonists loathed paying taxes and paper money seemed to he an n" 
way of paying government expenses, Massachusetts continued to issue new bills in order to retire the 
old bills as well as to pay new expenses. As the other colonies learned of the "marvels," they also began II> 
issue bills of credit. Price inflation, caused by the increasing unlikelihood of the bills' redemption in (oin. 
became common in varying degrees throughout the colonies. STUDENSKI & KROO'"'S . . ~l1rm Hotf' 10. ;tt 
14-15. 
27. THE FEDERALIST No. 42, at 285, and No. 44, at 299-300 (J. Madison) (.J. Cooke ed. J~JI;I). 
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should be a matter of national policy, in some respects fixed directly in the 
Constitution, and in others put under the authority of Congress."28 
During the American Revolution, the fledgling state governments as well as 
the Continental Congress issued paper bills of credit to raise funds for the war 
effort. 29 The multitude of currencies in circulation and the swollen paper money 
supply created havoc with respect to the values of the paper currencies.30 After 
the Revolution, the Continental Congress paid off their dollar at one-fortieth of 
par, despite the solemn "pledge" of "the United States and the public faith" 
contained in the Twelfth Article of Confederation for payment and satisfaction 
of all credit and debt of the confederation.3! This situation gave rise to the 
popular saying, "not worth a Continental."32 Devaluation of state bills of credit 
also occurred.33 For example, Virginia creditors found Virginia paper to be 
worth ten percent of its face value. 34 
In the winter of 1786-87, Daniel Shays led a rebellion of debtors and farmers 
in Massachusetts who wanted the state legislature to print and issue more paper 
money that could be used to pay debts.3s Although suppressed, Shays' Rebellion 
focused attention on the need for monetary uniformity in the new nation.36 The 
28. J. HURST, A LEGAL HISTORY OF MONEY!N THE UNITED STATES, 1774-1970, at 8 [hereinafter cited 
as HURSTj. 
29. See STUDENSKI & KROOSS, supra note 10, at 25,30; DUNNE, supra note 11, at 6-10. 
30. See STUDENSKI & KROOSS, supra note 10, at 37-8; DUNNE, supra note II, at 7-10. 
31. DUNNE, supra note II, at 9. 
All bills of credit emitted, moneys borrowed, debts contracted, by or under the authority of 
congress, before the assembling of the United States, in pursuance of the present confedera-
tion, shall be deemed and considered as a charge against the United States, for payment and 
satisfaction whereof the said United States and the public faith are hereby solemnly pledged. 
U.S. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. 12 (1778). 
32. COCHRAN, supra note 4, at 40. 
33. STUDENSKI & KROOSS, supra note 10, at 28-30; DUNNE, supra note II, at II. 
34. DuNNE, supra note II, at II. 
35. G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPuBLIC: 1776-1787, at 284-85, 325, 412-13 [here-
inafter cited as WOOD j. Shays' Rebellion in central and western Massachusetts expressed the discontent 
which was widespread throughout New England during the economic depression following the Revolu-
tion. Led by Daniel Shays, a Revolutionary War veteran and officeholder from Pelham, Massachusetts, 
the insurgents resorted to armed efforts to intimidate and close the courts to prevent action against 
debtors. By February 1787, state troops had suppressed the rebellion. THE FEDERALIST No.6, at 31, ed. 
note (A. Hamiltion) O. Cooke ed. 1961). "If Shays had not been a desperate debtor it is much to be 
doubted whether Massachusetts would have been plunged into a civil war." Id. 
36. See WOOD, supra note 35, at 412-13. Although the Articles of Confederation referred to bills of 
credit issued by act of Congress, U.S. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION arts. 9, 12 (1778), they did not 
exclusively delegate this power to Congress. Since each state thereunder "retain[edj ... every power, 
jmisdiction and right ... not ... expressly delegated to the United States [,bills of credit werejleft in 
their hands by the confederation as a concurrent right with that of Congress." THE FEDERALIST No. 44, at 
299-300 O. Madison) O. Cooke ed. 1961). In an expression of relief at the Constitution's prohibition of 
state-issued bills of credit, Madison continued: 
The loss which America has sustained since the peace, from the pestilent effects of paper 
money, on the necessary confidence between man and man; on the necessary confidence in the 
public councils; on the industry and morals of the people, and on the character of Republican 
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issue culminated when, in the late spring of 1787, the fifty delegates to the first 
Constitutional Convention of the United States met in Philadelphia. Keynote 
speaker Edmund Randolph noted that "the havoc of paper money" was a major 
problem to be considered by the Convention.37 
2. Constitutional Remedies 
The U.S. Constitution empowers Congress to coin and regulate the value of 
money. In response to the existing monetary problems, the delegates to the 
Constitutional Convention restricted state interference with monetary affairs in 
five ways. First, the Constitution forbids the states to coin money,3S a power the 
states had shared with Congress under Article Nine of the Articles of Confedera-
tion. 39 This Article was a step towards achieving uniformity in the value of 
current coin. 
Second, only Congress can regulate the value of money and of foreign coin.40 
This clause continued the policy under the Articles of Confederation that gave 
Congress the sole authority to determine the value of coin minted by the states or 
the national governmentY The clause also corrected a defect in the Articles, 
which omitted Congressional power to control the value of foreign coin.42 As 
James Madison wrote in Federalist No. 42: "It must be seen at once that the 
proposed uniformity in the value of the current coin might be destroyed by 
subjecting that of foreign coin to the different regulations of the different 
States."43 
Government, constitutes an enormous debt against the States chargeable with this unadvised 
measure ... or rather an accumulation of guilt, which can be expiated no otherwise than bv a 
voluntary sacrifice on the altar of justice, of the power which has been the instrument of it. In 
addition to these persuasive considerations, it may be observed that the same reasons which 
shew [sic] the necessity of denying to the States the power of regulating coin, prove with equal 
force that they ought not to be at liberty to substitute a paper medium in the place of coin. Had 
every State [these rights], there might be as many different currencies as States; and thus the 
intercourse among them would be impeded; retrospective alterations in its value might be 
made, and thus the citizens of other States would be injured; and animosities be kindled among 
the States themselves. The subjects of foreign powers might suffer from the same cause, and 
hence the Union be discredited and embroiled by the indiscretion of a single member .... The 
power to make any thing but gold and silver a tender in payment of debts, is withdrawn from 
the States, on the same principle with that of striking of paper currency. 
[d. at 300-301. 
37. DUNNE,supra note I I, at 11. The sentiments at the Constitutional Convention were generally split 
between those who thought all "paper currency" should be avoided and those "who were able to 
distinguish between the excesses of a paper currency and the obvious role that this medium would haw 
to play in any future national monetary mechanism." [d. 
38. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, d. I. 
39. See STUDENSKI & KROOss,supra note 10, at 36-37; U.S. ARTICLES OF CON FED ERA rJ<)N art. 9 (I 77H). 
See notes 41-42 and accompanying text infra. 
40. See U.S. CON ST. art. I, § 8, d. 5. 
41. HURST, supra note 28, at 8. 
42. U.S. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. 9 (1778). 
43. THE FEDERALIST No. 42, at 285 O. Madison) O. Cooke ed. (961). 
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Third, the Constitution prohibits the states from emitting bills of credit.44 For 
the same reasons that the Framers denied the states the power to regulate coin, 
the states "were not to be at liberty to substitute a paper medium in place of 
coin."45 Madison argued in Federalist No. 44 that without a prohibition on the 
issuance of state currencies, competition between various state currencies would 
have a disuniting and injurious effect. Moreover, the Union itself could be 
discredited in the eyes of foreign powers.46 
Fourth, the Constitution declares "[n]o state shall ... make anything but 
gold and silver coin a tender in payment of debts .... "47 The Framers withdrew 
the power to make anything but gold or silver a tender in payment of debts 
from the states as to prevent the states from issuing money.48 This prohibition 
changed the Articles of Confederation, which by silence left the matter of 
creating legal tenders to state discretion.49 
Finally, the Constitution empowers Congress "[t]o provide for the punishment 
of counterfeiting the securities and current coin of the United States."50 This 
clause provides the legal basis for prosecuting those who counterfeit U.S. coins 
or securities. Its purpose is to secure the value of both. 51 According to James 
Willard Hurst, this clause "is part of the implied bias of the Constitution toward 
making the federal government the primary authority, if not the monopolist, in 
regulating the money supply."52 
Besides clearly separating state and federal powers respecting money by Con-
stitutional fiat, the Framers exhibited a complete accord that the federal gov-
ernment should control money by decisively defeating two proposals that would 
have liberalized the money clauses in favor of the states at the Constitutional 
Convention. Several convention participants suggested that the Constitution 
should allow the states to emit bills of credit or define legal tender subject to 
Congressional authorization or veto.53 Either of these provisions would have 
allowed states to issue paper money. The Convention voted eight to one, with 
44. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, c1. 1. 
45. THE FEDERALIST No. 44, at 300 U. Madison) U. Cooke ed. 1961). For a discussion of this 
prohibition, see note 36 sutyra. 
46. THE FEDERALIST No. 44, at 300 U. Madison) U. Cooke ed. 1961). 
47. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, c1. 1. 
48. See STUDENSKI & KROOSS, sutyra note 10, at 37. 
49. Id. See note 36 supra. 
50. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 6. 
51. THE FEDERALIST No. 42, at 285 (J. Madison) (J. COOKE ed. 1961). 
52. HURST, sutyra note 28, at 13. 
53. /d. at 9. The Articles of Confederation had allowed both of these rights to the States.ld. In the 
matter of bills of credit, the Articles had "left to the states full discretion in issuing evidences of debt 
which might circulate as money."ld. at 9. By stating that "no state shall ... make anything but gold and 
silver coin a tender in payment of debts," U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, c1. I, the Framers likewise deprived 
the states of discretion to define legal tender. HURST, sutyra note 28, at 9. This is clear evidence that the 
Framers intended that ultimate control of the money supply be a matter of national policy.ld. 
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one state divided, not to allow the states to emit bills of credit.54 Further, the 
Convention unanimously rejected the proposition that the Constitution permit 
the states to make anything but gold and silver legal tender. 55 Every state 
ratifying the convention approved this decision; none offered opposing or 
qualifying amendments. 56 "Throughout," James Willard Hurst has stated, "the 
explicit denial of state coinage and the implicit denial of state authority to fix 
money values stood in absolute form."57 
The Framers sought to promote "harmony and proper intercourse" among 
the states and between the new nation and foreign nations through the new 
Constitution. 58 With this in mind, the Framers directed the monetary provisions 
of the Constitution toward standardizing and stabilizing the money supply by 
giving absolute power to control coins and currencies, U.S. and foreign, to the 
national government. 59 
B. Currently Circulating Foreign Gold Coins and Bullion 
The gold bullion coins that the State of New Jersey60 and other states seek to 
subject to their sales taxes include: American Arts Gold Medallions,61 South 
African Krugerrands,62 Canadian Gold Maple Leafs,63 British Gold 
Sovereigns,64 Austrian Gold Coronas and Mexican Gold Pesos.65 Of these 
coins, the Krugerrand,66 the Gpld Maple Leaf67 and the Sovereign68 are statutor-
54. HURST. supra note 28, at 8. 
55. [d. For the original votes see 2 M. FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL 
CONVENTION· OF 1787, at 435, 439 (rev. ed. 1937). 
56. HURST, supra note 28, at 9·10 (citing C. WARREN, THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 550, 775, 
776 (1928)). 
57. [d. 
58. THE FEDERALIST No. 42, at 287 O. Madison) O. Cooke ed. 1961). 
59. [d.; HURST, supra note 28 at 9; see also STUDENSKI & KROOSS, supra note 10, at 41. 
60. Armstrong v. Director, Div. of Taxation, No. ST 253A-81, at 3-6 (T.C.N.]. Feb. 19, 1981) 
(stipulation of facts). 
61. The U.S. government issued these coins pursuant to the American Arts Gold Medallion Act, Pub. 
L. No. 95-630, 92 Stat. 3679 (1978). 
62. The South African Chamber of Mines issues the Krugerrand pursuant to the South African Mint 
and Coinage Act, No. 78 of 1964, as amentied by South African Mint and Coinage Further Amendment 
Act, No. 40 of 1966. 
63. See Currency and Exchange Act, CAN. REV. STAT., ch. C-39, § 4, sched. 1 (1970) (amended by Order 
of Privy Council No. 3048 (1979». This Act assigns to the maple leaf gold coin a value of $50 (U.S.). [d. 
64. See Coinage Act, 1971, ch. 24, §§ 1-2, sched. 1. 
65. Armstrong v. Director, Div. of Taxation, No. ST 253A-81, at 4 (T.C.N.]. Feb. 19, 1981) 
(stipulation of facts). 
66. See South African Mint and Coinage Act, No. 78 of 1964, as amended by South African Mint and 
Coinage Amendment Act, No. 21 of 1966 anti South African Mint and Coinage Further Amendment 
Act, No. 40 of 1966, §§ 11-12; S. Afr. Gov't Proc. No. R 280 of 1972, reprinted in 88 REPUB. S. AFR. GAZ., 
Oct. 25, 1972 at 1; S. Afr. Gov't Proc. No. 154 of 1967, reprinted in 25 REpUB. S. AFR. GAz.,July 21, 1967, 
at I. 
67. See Currency and Exchange Act, CAN. REV. STAT. ch. C-39, § 4, sched. I (1970). 
68. See Coinage Act, 1971, ch. 24, § 2, sched. 1. 
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ily recognized by their respective governments as legal tender.69 Investors trade 
the other coins under the classification of "official government restrike."70 
The current price of gold as determined on the international commodities 
market establishes the prices of these items. 71 Generally a dealer offers these 
items for sale during the hours of the day when the international commodities 
market is open to transactions in gold at prices which include a brokerage 
commiSSIOn. 
The Division of Taxation of the State of New Jersey has declared a policy that 
according to the Sales and Use Tax Act the retail sale of gold and silver bullion, 
U.S. coins priced by metal content rather than face value, and gold coins issued 
by foreign governments are sales of "tangible personal property."72 The New 
Jersey Division of Taxation predicates this policy upon the fact that the prices of 
such gold and silver bullion, U.S. coins and foreign government-issue coins are 
determined by the price of gold and silver on the international commodities 
market. 73 
1. Legal Tender Gold Coins 
Proponents of state taxation of gold coins contend that legal tender foreign 
gold coins such as the Krugerrand and the Maple Leaf are subject to sales tax 
because they do not circulate as an every day medium of exchange anywhere in 
the world, and they are tangible personal property with inherent, rather than a 
representative, value, as determined on international commodities markets. 74 
However, no precedent in U.S. law supports or permits a state to distinguish 
between types of foreign coins. Only Congress can make such a distinction. Such 
action by Congress would entail deciding that certain foreign coins are not 
"coins" within the meaning of the Constitution. Only then could states tax 
transactions involving these coins. Never in U.S. history has Congress given this 
kind of control over foreign money to the states. 
A decision by an appellate court of the State of Florida supports the proposi-
tion that no precedent exists for a state to distinguish between types of foreign 
69. Armstrong v. Director, Div. of Taxation, No. ST 253A-81, at 4 (T.C.N.J. Feb. 19, 1981) 
(stipulation of facts). 
70. See generally MANFRA, TORDELLA & BROOKS, INC., FOREIGN QUOTATIONS (1981). 
71. See, e.g., id. 
72. Sales and Use Tax Act, N.]. STAT. ANN. 54: 32 B-2(g) (West 1980). This section defines tangible 
personal property as "corporeal personal property of any nature." [d. See Armstrong v. Director, Div. of 
Taxation, No. ST 253A-81, at 6 (T.e.N.]. Feb. 19, 1981) (stipulation of facts). See also III STATE TAX 
NEWS (Aug.-Sept. 1974). 
73. Armstrong v. Director, Div. of Taxation, No. ST 253A-81, at 6 (T.e.N.J. Feb. 19, 1981) 
(stipulation of facts). 
74. [d. at 6-7. 
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coins. In Smith v. Department of Revenue, 75 the court determined that the Florida 
legislature did not intend to tax coins such as the Krugerrand. Florida sales tax 
applies to retail sales of tangible personal property. 76 The Florida statute makes 
a distinction between tangible and intangible personal property and excludes 
intangible property from the sales tax. 77 The statute further defines "intangible 
personal property" to include "money."7B Thus, the Florida legislature excluded 
money from the sales tax. 79 
The issue before the Court was whether the Krugerrand is subject to the 
Florida sales and use tax. The state contended that the Krugerrand is not money. 
The trial court held that the sale of Krugerrands is taxable as a sale of tangible 
property. The trial court judge made the following findings of fact: 
"1. That the gold Krugerrand is a unique gold coin without a fixed 
value and which cannot be viewed in the subject transactions as being 
true legal tender of South Africa, notwithstanding its designation as 
such by statute. 
"2. That the Krugerrand is not used and freely circulated as coin-
age/currency since its value would diminish by the loss of gold 
content. 
"3. That the primary purposes of minting gold Krugerrands is for 
sale of gold in an attractive and convenient form rather than a gold 
bullion requiring assaying. 
"4. That gold Krugerrands, when sold in the State of Florida, are 
properly to be deemed tangible property subject to Florida sales tax 
as provided by statute."BO 
On appeal, the State of Florida urged that the term "money" means only U.S. 
money and that the definition does not "include money which is a bullion-type 
coin, such as the Krugerrand."Bt The appellate court did not agree. The court 
found that case law does not support "a distinction between foreign and U.S. 
money in determining whether the former is tangible or intangible personal 
property."B2 The court found no basis for the drawing of such a distinction. 
Accordingly, the appeals court reversed the trial court's judgment.B3 
In another set of cases the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
recognized the Krugerrand to be currency for purposes of U.S. tariff laws. The 
75. 376 So. 2d 421 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979). 
76. FLA. STAT. § 212.05 (West 1977). 
77. Id. §§ 199.023(1), 212.05, 212.02(12). 
78. Id. § 199.023(1). 
79. Smith v. Dep't of Revenue, 376 So. 2d at 422. 
80. Id. at 421-22. 
81. Id. at 422. 
82. Id. 
83.Id. 
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cases of Benson v. Hightower84 and Seguin v. Eide 85 both involved suits by private 
persons against U.S. Customs officials who had wrongfully detained the plain-
tiffs for failure to declare Krugerrands upon entry into the United States. The 
government had dropped charges against the plaintiffs, based on a finding that 
the Krugerrand is currency.86 The U.S. Tariff Schedules state that currencies do 
not need to be declared.87 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit did 
not challenge this conclusion. 
The Tariff Schedules of the United States exempt from declaration "currency 
(metal or paper) in current circulation in any country and imported for mone-
tary purposes."88 The Schedule, however, does contain specific items for gold 
coins and bullion. Gold coins, such as the Krugerrand, which (a) are the genuine 
issue of the government concerned, and (b) are declared by official proclamation 
to be accepted as legal tender, are metal coins. Metal coins enter the United 
States duty-free.89 Gold bullion, the form, shape or markings of which does not 
increase the value of the mass beyond that of the metal itself, also enters 
duty-free. 9o U.S. Customs enters other articles of gold at a duty rate of 17.1 % ad. 
val.91 Retail distributors of Krugerrands are subject to penalties under the 
Currency and Foreign Transactions Act if they do not keep records with respect 
to their transactions. 92 Further, counterfeiters of Krugerrands can expect to be 
prosecuted under federal counterfeiting laws. 93 These facts are consistent with 
the view that all foreign coin in the United States, declared to be legal tender in 
the country of origin, is subject to national, and not to state, regulation. To allow 
states to assess sales tax on gold coin transactions would violate the principle of 
federalism. 
2. Non-Legal Tender Gold Coins 
Aside from the Krugerrand and the Maple Leaf, the remaining gold coins that 
currently circulate in the United States mayor may not be legal tender in their 
respective countries of origin. Neither the U.S. Treasury Department nor the 
84. 633 F.2d 869 (9th Cir. 1980). 
85. 645 F.2d 804 (9th Cir. 1981). 
86. See Berson v. Hightower, 633 F.2d at 869-70; Sequin v. Eide, 645 F.2d at 807. 
87. TSUS, 19 U.S.C. § 1202 hn. 5(b) (1976). 
88. TSUS, 19 U.S.C. § 1202 hn. 5(b) (1976). 
89. Id. § 1202 item 653.22. 
90. !d. § 1202 item 605.20. See Letter to the author, Neal S. Solomon, from Jordan Luke, Assistant 
General Counsel, U.S. Dept. of the Treasury I (August 12, 1981). 
91. TSUS, 19 U.S.C. § 1202 item 656.10 (1976). 
92. Act of Oct. 26,1970, Pub. L. No. 91-508, § 2, 84 Stat. 1118 (codified at 31 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1081 
(1976». See also meaning of terms, 31 C.F.R. § 103.11, which defines monetary instrument to include 
coin of any other country the title of which passes upon delivery. The reporting requirement of the 
Currency and Foreign Transactions Act applies to currency and other monetary instruments. Id. 
§ 103.23. 
93. See Bogus K-Rands Bum Texans, World Coin News, Mar. 17, 1981, at 7, col. 2. 
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U.S. Customs Service maintains a list of foreign gold coins which are legal 
tender.94 The lack of a list supports the argument that an official declaration of 
legal tender status is not necessary as long as the coin bears the mark of a nation. 
However, regardless of whether these other gold coins are not declared to be 
legal tender in their respective countries of origin and are "bullion," rather than 
"coins," the conclusion that non-legal tender gold coins cannot be subject to 
various state sales taxes does not change. This conclusion is the subject of the 
next section of this article, which argues that bullion is money under the U.S. 
Constitution and is subject to the same uniform federal authority as U.S. and 
foreign coins and currencies. 
3. Gold Bullion 
a. The U.S. Tradition of Gold as Money 
According to current textbooks, money has three functions: it serves as (1) a 
medium of exchange; (2) a unit of account (or measure of value); and (3) a store 
of value (one of many media in which wealth may be held).95 Gold and silver 
coins and bullion also serve these same functions. Gold has a limited supply, can 
be stored, carried or traded conveniently, and maintains a monetary value 
independent of its value for non-monetary practical uses.96 In the case of either 
coin or bullion, one can determine value readily by reference to weight and 
fineness.97 Excluding "collector coins," markings or changes in the form of the 
coins and bullion do not alter their value.98 Therefore, as this analysis suggests, 
gold, whether in coin or bullion form, is money. 
People have used gold and silver as money since the earliest days of com-
merce.99 During the past four centuries, European and North American nations 
have coined gold and silver and have regulated the paper money supply by 
94. Letter to the author, Neal S. Solomon, from Jordan Luke, Assistant General Counsel, U.S. Dep't 
of the Treasury 1 (Oct. 29, 1981). The author wrote to the Office of General Counsel, U.S. Department 
of the Treasury, on August 27, 1981, to ask, among other things, for a list of the gold coins entered into 
the United States under Item 653.22 of the Tariff Schedules of the United States.see 19 U.S.C. § 1202 
item 653.22, which (a) were the genuine issue of the government concerned, and (b) were declared by 
official proclamation to be legal tender. That Office on October 29, 1981 replied: "Lack of the necessary 
information also prevents us from responding to the remainder of your numbered questions. As to 
your first question, neither the Treasury Department nor the Customs Service maintains a fixed list of 
the coins included in TSUS, item 653.22." Letter to the author, Neal S. Solomon, from Jordan Luke, 
Assistant General Counsel, U.S. Dep't. of the Treasury (Oct. 29, 1981). This response leads one to 
question: "[D]oes it matter whether or not a gold bullion coin is declared to be legal tender by its country 
of origin." Id. 
95. See SOLOMON, supra note 15, at 4. See, e.g., COCHRAN, supra note 4, at 8-9. 
96. COCHRAN, supra note 4, at 23. 
97. See, e.g., LowENFELD, supra note 15, at 9. 
98.Id. 
99. Id. at 21. 
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holding gold in their treasuries. 100 When several of the current nations of the 
world formed the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for the purpose of reg-
ulating the world monetary system,lOl the charter provided for each Fund 
member to establish, with Fund approval, a par value for its currency and to 
undertake to maintain market exchange rates for its currency within one percent 
of the declared par value. l02 A related provision l03 stated that the IMF would 
deem countries which freely buy and sell gold in settlement of international 
transactions to be adhering to this undertaking. Thus, the United States, the only 
country which met this condition, did not have to intervene in the foreign 
exchange markets. Rather, this provision required that other countries intervene 
principally by buying or selling dollars against their own currencies in order to 
maintain their own currencies' par value. l04 The result was that other countries 
had to keep their market exchange rates within one percent of their parities with 
the dollar, while the value of the dollar remained tied to the value of gold. l05 
Although the U.S. government will no longer redeem dollars with gold,106 this 
policy has not suspended the use of gold as money. The United States still holds 
a large portion of its reserve assets in the form of gold. l07 People and nations buy 
gold because gold is a medium of exchange that may be preferable to paper 
money, especially in time of inflation. Gold has a limited supply, can be stored or 
carried conveniently, is readily identifiable by weight and fineness and maintains 
a monetary value apart from its non-monetary uses. 
b. Gold and the Early Development of u.s. Monetary Policy 
Gold, silver and bills of credit are the only forms of money specifically named 
in the Constitution. lOB While the Constitution empowers Congress to regulate 
coin money, 109 it is silent as to whether or not Congress can issue paper currency. 
The U.S. Constitution prohibits the states from issuing paper money and allows 
them to make only gold or silver - and no other commodity - legal tender. llo 
100. Id. at 21-29. 
101. The IMF exists to promote international monetary cooperation, to enhance exchange stability, 
to improve the conditions of international trade, to promote and maintain widespread high levels of 
employment and real income, and to assist in adjusting disequilibrium in international balances of 
payments. IMF art. I (1944). See generally LOWENFELD, supra note 15. 
102. SOLOMON, supra note 15, at 12. Original Articles, infra note 233, at art. IV (1-3). 
103 Original Articles, infra note 233, at art. IV (4)(b). 
104. SOLOMON, supra note 15, at 12. 
105. Id. 
106. See note 15 supra. 
107. SOLOMON, supra note 15, at 334. 
lOS. See HURST, supra note 2S, at 16. "N 0 state shall ... emit bills of credit ... [or 1 make anything but 
gold and silver a tender in payment of debts .... " U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, col. I. 
109. See note 25 supra. 
110. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. I. 
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These constitutional provIsIOns affirm and protect the integrity of specie as 
money, at least so far as the states are concerned. As James Madison wrote: "The 
power to make anything but gold and silver a tender in payment of debts, is 
withdrawn from the States, on the same principal with that of issuing a paper 
currency."111 
Many of the delegates to the Constitutional Convention opposed a currency 
unsupported by specie, which explains why the Constitution does not expressly 
permit Congress to issue paper money.112 In The Federalist, Madison denounced 
the "pestilent effects of paper money" which, he charged, had occasioned eco-
nomic chaos and had inflicted destruction "on the necessary confidence between 
man and man, on the necessary confidence in the public councils, on the industry 
and morals of the people, and on the character of republican government."113 
By a vote of nine states to two, the Constitutional Convention defeated a pro-
posed provision which would have permitted Congress to issue bills of credit. I 14 
James Madison and other delegates believed that the Congressional grant of 
power "to borrow money" permitted the U.S. government to issue paper notes 
for limited, emergency purposes.11 5 Other delegates believed that eliminating 
the proposed clause barred the U.S. government from issuing paper money of 
any description for any purpose.11 6 In accordance with general expectations, the 
nation's first coinage act in 1792117 placed the United States on a bi-metallic 
standard of gold and silver coins. liB The U.S. government refrained from 
issuing paper money, irredeemable in specie, until the Civil War "green-
backs."119 
During the early history of the United States, Congress successively chartered 
two national banks designed to provide some overall direction for the national 
economy.120 A debate took place among U.S. policy makers over the constitu-
Ill. THE FEDERAUST No. 44, at 301 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961). 
112. DUNNE, supra note II, at 11-16. 
113. THE FEDERAUST No. 44, at 300 (}. Madison) (}. Cooke ed. 1961). 
114. HURST, supra note 28, at 14. 
115.ld. 
116. /d. 
117. An Act establishing a mint, and regulating the coins of the United States, ch. 16, § I, I Stat. 214 
(1792). 
118. See COCHRAN, supra note 4, at 40-41. The Founding Fathers were determined that a currency 
standard better and stronger than the paper standard should be established. Both gold and silver had 
forceful proponents among leaders in the government. Bi-metallism, a money standard based on both 
gold ;md silver, represented a compromise between the advantages of gold for large transactions and 
those of silver for small transactions. It was also a compromise between the gold monetary standard 
preferred by wealthy countries, such as Great Britain, and the silver preferred by poorer countries, such 
as those of Latin America. While the market value of gold varied less than that of silver, Spain had used 
silver most often in colonial trade. Id. at 41. 
119. See HURST, supra note 28, at 43, 49. 
120. An Act to incorporate the subscribers to the Bank of the United States, ch. 10, § I, I Stat. 19! 
(1791); An Act to incorporate the subscribers to the Bank of the United States, ch. 49, § 1,3 Stat. 266 
(1816). 
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tionality of the banks (bank charters are not among Congress' enumerated 
powers), the effect of national banking on state banks, and the public/private 
composition of the boards of directors. 121 No controversy existed, however, over 
whether national bank paper was redeemable in specie. The bi-metallic standard 
was an integral part of each bank's charter. 122 
The need for money to finance the Civil War strained the U.S. government's 
reliance on specie. 123 In February 1862, Congress passed the Legal Tender 
Act,124 which ultimately brought $450 million worth of Greenbacks into circula-
tion. 125 Like the Continentals of the Revolutionary era, the Greenbacks were 
paper currency, irredeemable in specie, authorized by Congress for wartime and 
intended to be temporary. When the Union government located an alternate 
method of financing the war - establishing another national bank - the is-
suance of Greenbacks decreased. 126 
Congress intended that the Greenbacks be retired after the Civil War end-
ed. 127 Although retirement progressed erratically in the post-war period, the 
government eventually completed the retirement of Greenbacks. In January 
121. See B. HAMMOND, BANKS AND POLITICS IN AMERICA FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE CIVIL WAR 
(1957) [hereinafter cited as HAMMOND]; STUDENSKI & KROOSS, supra note 10, at 60-62, 72-73, 83-88, 
103-07. Hamilton proposed the establishment of the First Bank of the United States in 1790, arguing 
that such a bank would make a threefold contribution to the economy. He asserted that it would: (I) 
increase the country's productive capital, because under the principle of capital reserve, a bank could 
issue two or three dollars in paper money for every dollar it had in specie; (2) help the government in 
borrowing; and (3) facilitate the payment and collection of taxes. [d. at 60. The Jeffersonian Party 
opposed the Bank as unconstitutional, since the power to create a bank was not among the enumerated 
powers of the Constitution, and would be a dangerous extension of federal power. These opponents 
also insisted that banks created usury, divested funds from agriculture, increased speculation, and 
drove specie out of the country. Hamilton replied both that the bank charter could avoid those 
problems and that a national bank would promote low interest rates by increasing the supply of money. 
[d. at 60-61. In February 1811, Congress refused to recharter the First Bank due, according to one 
author, to "an extensive and effective propaganda campaign, charging that the Bank was controlled by 
foreigners and was unconstitutionally created monopoly, far less efficient than the state banks." See 
generally id. at 72-73. 
Congress chartered the Second Bank of the United States in the aftermath of the War of 1812. [d. at 
75-84. That War had left the United States in the midst of unstable prices, a magnified national debt, 
swollen government expenses, and high taxes. [d. at 82. National leaders generally agreed that the most 
pressing fiscal problem was to restore order to the banking and currency system by returning to specie 
payments, which the state banks had suspended in 1814 in response to gold-hoarding. Since state banks 
would not resume specie payments, Congress deemed that a new national bank was in order. [d. at 
79-80, 83. Congress voted to recharter the Second Bank in 1832, but President Jackson vetoed the 
recharter for many of the same reasons that Congress refused to recharter the First Bank. Efforts to 
recharter the Bank continued until 1837 when the Second Bank failed in a depression. [d. at 103-07. 
122. STUDENSKI & KROOSS, supra note 10, at 124-25. 
123. [d. at 138-43. 
124. Legal Tender Act, ch. 3, 12 Stat. 345 (1862). 
125. See HURST, supra note 28, at 176; FRIEDMAN & SCHWARTZ, supra note 18, at 7, 44-50. 
126. STUDENSKI & KROOSS, supra note 10, at 153-54. 
127. [d. at. 71; I. UNGER, THE GREENBACK ERA: A SOCIAL AND POLITICAL HISTORY OF AMERICAN 
FINANCE, 1865-1879, at 13-16 (1964). 
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1875, Congress passed the Resumption Act, directing the U.S. Treasury to 
begin, effective January 1, 1879, the redemption in coin of all Greenbacks.128 
With passage of the Resumption Act, the nation returned to a de facto gold 
standard, ending the Greenback period of 1862-1879.129 
The major debate with respect to money in the United States from the Civil 
War until 1900, when the U.S. Congress officially adopted the gold standard,13O 
centered on gold versus silver. Neither side of the debate, the "free silverites" or 
the "gold bugs,"131 questioned the legitimacy of gold as the primary metal 
supporting the nation's currency. However, they debated the merits of a mono-
(gold) or bi-metallic (gold and silver) standard. 
Led by William Jennings Bryan, the Silverites demanded the return of legal 
tender status to silver. 132 Bryan spoke for an agrarian debtor class which believed 
that government issuance of silver coins would lower the cost of money by 
putting more money in circulation. His opponent, William McKinley, rep-
resented supporters of a uniform gold standard which their platform stated 
would not "debase our currency or impair the credit of our country."133 In the 
Presidential election of 1896, McKinley overwhelmingly won. 134 
Following McKinley's victory, Congress enacted the Gold Standard Act 
(officially called the Currency Act) on March 4, 1900.135 The Gold Standard Act 
placed the United States on a de jure gold standard for the first time by 
designating the gold dollar as the official standard unit of value. 136 The Act 
directed the Secretary of the Treasury to maintain all forms of money in parity 
with gold.137 In addition, the Act required the Secretary to set aside $150 million 
in gold coin and bullion to be used to redeem the Greenbacks and the Treasury 
notes of 1890. 138 
In 1910, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed that private ownership of silver is 
subject to the monetary authority of the U.S. government. 139 After the United 
States had acquired the Philippine Islands, Congress established a governing 
commission for the Islands which adopted a silver coinage of less than bullion 
value and which prohibited the export of silver coins from the islands. The 
128. Specie Payment Resumption Act, ch. 15, § 3, 18 Stat. 296 (1875) (codified at 31 U.S.C. § 402 
(1976)). 
129. COCHRAN, supra note 4, at 45; FRIEDMAN & SCHWARTZ, supra note 18, at 7, 85. 
130. Currency Act of 1900, ch. 41, 31 Stat. 45 (codified at 41 U.S.C. § 314 (1978)). 
131. STUDENSKI & KROOSS, supra note 10, at 231-34. 
132. [d. 
133. /d. at 232 (quoting the Republican platform). 
134. [d. at 233; COCHRAN, supra note 4, at 45-46. See also P. GLAD, McKINLEY, BRYAN AND THE PEOPLE 
189,200-01 (1964); S. JONES, THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OF 1896, at 332-50 (1964). 
135. Currency Act of 1900, ch. 41, 31 Stat. 45 (codified at 41 U.S.c. § 314 (1978)). 
136. [d. 
137. /d. § I. 
138. [d. § 2. 
139. Ling Su Fan v. United States, 218 U.S. 302 (1910). 
314 BOSTON COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. V, No.2 
Philippine government tried and convicted a Chinese resident, who had at-
tempted to export silver coins, of violating the prohibition. The defendant, Ling 
Su Fan, appealed, claiming deprivation of property without due process of law in 
violation of the fifth amendment. 
The U.S. Supreme Court unanimously upheld the conviction. While the Court 
expressed its preference for "laissez faire" principles and noted that the law at 
issue might be "unwise," it nonetheless upheld the law as a valid exercise of the 
power derived from an express act of Congress. 140 The court stated: 
Conceding the title of the owner of such coins, yet there is attached 
to such ownership those limitations which public policy may require 
by reason of their quality as a legal tender and as a medium of 
exchange .... They bear, therefore, the impress of sovereign power 
which fixes value and authorizes their use in exchange .... 
However unwise a law may be, aimed at the exportation of such 
coins ... there can be no serious doubts but that the power to coin 
money includes the power to prevent its outflow from the country of 
its origin .... 141 
In 1913, Congress authorized new paper currency, Federal Reserve Notes, by 
the Federal Reserve Act. 142 Under this Act, Congress intended that the notes be 
supported by not less than forty percent in gold and gold certificates. 143 The Act 
required each federal reserve bank to maintain a minimum gold reserve. 144 This 
reserve helped to put U.S. gold-supported currency on a solid basis. 145 By the 
end of World War I the United States held forty percent of the world's known 
gold reserves. 
During World War I, in response to the flow of gold out of the U.S. Treasury, 
Congress enacted the Trading With the Enemy Act,146 which gives the President 
emergency powers, including the power to regulate or prohibit transactions in 
gold and to prohibit the "hoarding" of gold.147 Although Congress enacted this 
140. ld. at 310. See Act of July I, 1902, ch. 1369,32 Stat. 691, 692. Ling Su Fan v. United States, 218 
U.S. at 310. 
141. The court also stated that the quality of coins "as a legal tender is an attribute of law aside from 
their bullion value," id. at 310, which gives to coins "a value which does not attach as a mere consequence 
of intrinsic value." ld. at 310-11. However, the court appears to have made this statement in response to 
the appellant'S contention that the law deprived him of property without compensation, i.e., the 
difference between value of the bullion and the coin. See id. at 310. 
142. Federal Reserve Act, ch. 6, § 16,38 Stat. 251, 266 (1913); see FRIEDMAN & SCHWARTz,supra note 
18, at 190-92; STUDENSKI & KROOSS, supra note 10, at 258-60; COCHRAN, supra note 4, at 47. 
143. See STUDENSKI & KRooss, supra note 10, at 259; Federal Reserve Act, ch. 6, § 16,38 Stat. 251, 
266 (1913). 
144. Federal Reserve Act, ch. 6, § 16,38 Stat. 251, 266 (1913). 
145. See COCHRAN, supra note 4, at 47. 
146. Ch. 106, § 5(b), 40 Stat. 415 (1917) (codified at 12 U.S.C. 95(a) (1976». 
147. See STUDENSKI & KRooss, supra note 10, at 294. Violation of the regulations promulgated under 
this Act carry penalties of up to ten years in jail and $10,000 in fines. Trading with the Enemy Act, ch. 
106, § 5(b), 40 Stat. 415 (1917) (codified at 12 U.S.C. 95(a) (1976». 
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Act in 1917, the federal government did not fully utilize the provisions of the 
Trading With the Enemy Act until the Great Depression. 148 The Depression 
confronted the government with a serious monetary crisis. Most commercial 
banks in the United States had closed by Inauguration Day, March 4, 1933.149 
Many banks had failed, and the executive orders of state governors barred 
others from doing business. Anxious Americans, demanding gold, had reduced 
the Federal Reserve's gold supply almost to the legal minimum. 15o Faced with a 
banking crisis, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, shortly after taking office, 
and relying on the Trading With the Enemy Act, proclaimed a "bank holiday" on 
March 6, 1933. This proclamation closed all banks and prohibited them from 
authorizing the withdrawal of specie. 151 The effect was to cut off all access to 
gold coin and bullion located in bank vaults and personal safe deposit boxes. 
Three days later, Congress passed the Emergency Banking Relief Act, giving the 
U.S. government wide discretionary powers, including the power to require 
Americans to surrender their gold - whether bullion, coin or certificates - for 
paper money.152 President Roosevelt then, by an executive order on March 10, 
1933, outlawed the export of gold coin, bullion and gold certificates without a 
license from the Secretary of the Treasury,153 placed an embargo on all interna-
tional gold dealings, and ordered that all persons in the United States holding 
gold surrender such gold to the government in return for currency.154 
On June 5, 1933, Congress, by joint resolution, voided all clauses in private 
and public contracts which required payment in gold, declaring such clauses to 
be "against public policy."155 That same year, Congress passed the Thomas 
Amendment to the Agricultural Adjustment Act, making all U.S. coins and 
currency legal tender. 156 President Roosevelt, in accordance with discretionary 
powers authorized by the Thomas Amendment, devalued the gold dollar by 
reducing its gold content. 157 
These actions effectively placed the United States on a floating exchange rate 
148. See STUDENSKI & KRooss, supra note 10, at 383. 
149. [d. at 381. 
150. I d. at 380. 
151. Proclamation No. 2039, 31 C.F.R. 340 (1982), reprinted in 48 Stat. 1689 (1933), and in II PUBUC 
PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKUN D. ROOSEVELT, THE YEAR OF CRISIS 24-29 (1938). 
152. Emergency Banking Relief Act, ch. I, § 3, 48 Stat. 1 (1933) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 95(b) and 50 
U.S.C. appeal § 5 note (1980». See FRIEDMAN & SCHWARTZ, supra note 18, at 328, 421-22; STUDENSKI & 
KRooss, supra note 10, at 294, 383. 
153. Executive Order No. 6073, 31 C.F.R. 341 (1982). 
154. See FRIEDMAN & SCHWARTZ, supra note 18, at 463. 
155. To assure uniform value to the coins and currencies of the United States, ch. 48, § I, 48 Stat. 
112-13 (1933). 
156. Thomas Amendment to Agricultural Adjustment Act, ch. 25, § 43, 48 Stat. 31, 52 (1933), 
repealed by Act of July 23, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-81, § 210, 79 Stat. 257 (1965). 
157. STUDENSKI & KROOss,supra note 10, at 386-87; FRIEDMAN & SCHWARTz,supra note 18, at 465. 
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until January 1934, when Congress passed the Gold Reserve Act. ls8 This Act 
placed the United States on an international gold bullion standard and on a 
domestic irredeemable paper standard. The Gold Reserve Act further granted 
to the U.S. government title to all gold coin and bullion held by any U.S. 
citizen. 159 This Act also prohibited the minting of gold coins and empowered the 
Secretary of the Treasury to buy and sell gold. 160 Treasury Secretary Morgen-
thau then fixed the price of gold at $35 per ounce, and President Roosevelt 
devalued the dollar to 59.06% of its former value. 161 Persons surrendering gold, 
however, received only the former price of $20.67 per ounce. 162 
The issue of the constitutionality of the joint Congressional resolution abrogat-
ing gold clauses came before the U.S. Supreme Court in 1935. In Norman v. 
Baltimore & Ohio Railroad CO.,163 the aggrieved party held a railroad bond that 
called for payment in gold, and disputed the government's right to force him to 
accept devalued currency. Chief Justice Hughes, after surveying the money cases 
from McCulloch v. Maryland l64 through Ling Su Fan, 165 denied Norman's claim, 
stating: 
Contracts, however express, cannot fetter the constitutional author-
ity of the Congress. Contracts may create rights of property, but 
when contracts deal with a subject matter which lies within the 
control of the Congress, they have a congenital infirmity. Parties 
cannot remove their transactions from the reach of dominant con-
stitutional power by making contracts about them.166 
In describing the federal government's Constitutional power to regulate the 
value of money, the Court stated that "[t]he states cannot declare what shall be 
money, or regulate its value."167 
In a second case, Nortz v. United States, 168 the appellant held a gold certificate 
representing bullion. Nortz claimed that by requiring him to surrender his gold 
certificate for irredeemable paper currency the government was depriving him 
158. Gold Reserve Act of 1934, ch. 6, § 2(a), 48 Stat. 337 (codified at 31 U.S.C. §§ 441, 490 (1976». 
159. [d. ch. 6, §§ 2,6. See FRIEDMAN & SCHWARTZ, supra note 18, at 469-71; STUDENSKI & KRooss, 
supra note 10, at 389-90. 
160. Gold Reserve Act of 1934, ch. 6, §§ 5, 8, 48 Stat. 337 (codified at 31 U.S.C. §§ 441, 490 (1976». 
161. STUDENSKI & KROOSS, supra note 10, at 390. 
162. See id. at 390 n.4. 
163. Norman v. Baltimore & O.R. Co., 294 U.S. 240 (1935). 
164. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819) (determined the constitutionality of the 
First Bank of the United States under the composite constitutional power of Congress to control the 
national monetary system and currency). The court stated that the Constitution gave Congress such 
exclusive power in order to achieve "a national government with sovereign powers." [d. at 404-07. 
165. Ling Su Fan v. United States, 218 U.S. 302 (1910). 
166. Norman v. Baltimore & O.R. Co., 294 U.S. at 307-08. 
167. [d. at 303-
168. Nortz v. United States, 294 U.S. 317 (1935). 
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of property in violation of the due process clause of the fifth amendment. Nortz 
argued that upon surrender of the certificates he should receive payment based 
on the amount of gold represented by the certificates. At that time, the amount 
of gold represented by the certificates had a value in excess of the face amount of 
the certificates in devalued U.S. dollars, on the commodities exchanges; gold was 
selling on the world market for $33.43 an ounce. Therefore, Nortz claimed that 
he should receive that amount, and not the pre-devaluation price of $20.67. 169 
The Court, however, refused to accept the world market price as a standard by 
which to measure N ortz's loss. Relying on Ling Su Fan, 170 the Court found gold, 
"as a legal tender and as a medium of exchange," to be subject to the authority of 
the government. 1 71 The Court reasoned that the promise in the certificate to pay 
in gold was just a promise to pay in current money which Congress made under 
its authority to regulate currency. The Court found that plaintiff had not 
suffered any loss because he had received payment in money.172 
In the same year, In Perry v. United States 173 a petitioner made a similar 
argument to require the government to pay him $16,921.14 in devalued paper 
currency for the $10,000 Liberty bond he held. However, unlike Norman 174 and 
Nortz, 175 Perry involved a public contract with a gold clause. The Court nonethe-
less denied the petitioner's claim based on the market value of gold because, 
since Congress had authorized the prohibition of the exportation of gold coin 
and the placing of restrictions upon transactions in foreign exchange," he could 
show no damages. 176 Justice Stone in the concurring opinion of the 5-4 decision 
rejected the petitioner's claim that the obligation of the gold clause in govern-
ment bonds was greater than in private bonds: 
[Ilt is unnecessary, and I think undesirable, for the Court to undertake 
to say that the obligation of the gold clause in Government bonds is 
greater than in the bonds of private individuals, or that in some 
situation not described, and in some manner and in some measure 
undefined, it has imposed restrictions upon the future exercise of 
the power to regulate the currency. 177 
Justice Stone based his conclusion on the importance of the sovereign power to 
regulate money: 
169. /d. at 323. 
170. 218 U.S. 302 (1910). 
171. Nortz v. United States, 294 U.S. at 330. 
172. Id. at 328-29. 
173. Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330 (1935). 
174. 294 U.S. 240 (1935). 
175.294 U.S. 317 (1935). 
176. Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. at 357. 
177. Id. at 359. 
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I therefore do not join in so much of the opinion as may be taken 
to suggest that the exercise of the sovereign power to borrow money 
on credit, which does not override the sovereign immunity from suit, 
may nevertheless preclude or impede the exercise of another 
sovereign power, to regulate the value of money. 178 
c. The Post World War II Period 
The United States entered the post-World War II period in a strong position 
relative to the war-ravaged nations of Europe.179 Between 1945 and 1950, 
European nations eagerly pursued American dollars, which were backed by gold 
reserves exceeding $20 billion, or over sixty percent of the world's total gold 
stock. 180 By the 1960's, however, U.S. balance of payments problems and inter-
national inflation caused U.S. gold reserves to begin to plummet.181 As of 1980, 
reserves totalled approximately $12 billion, reportedly 265 million troy ounces, 
which amounts to perhaps twenty-five percent of the world's known gold re-
serves. 182 
In response to the growing U.S. balance of payments problem and in an 
attempt to halt the outflow of U.S. gold reserves, the Congress and four presi-
dential administrations have instituted a variety of measures. In 1961, President 
Eisenhower issued an executive order restricting the holding of gold overseas by 
U.S. citizens. 183 In 1962, President Kennedy issued an executive order prohibit-
ing American citizens from owning gold bullion overseas and requiring those 
who held gold abroad· to sell it. 184 
As international confidence in the dollar waned, demand for gold increased. 
When the United States realized that maintaining the market price of gold close 
to the official price by selling U.S. gold reserves was no longer feasible, 185 
Congress in 1968 removed the twenty-five percent gold requirement on Federal 
Reserve currency and ended the convertibility of dollars into gold for Amer-
icans. 186 In the spring of that year, a group of international bankers put into 
operation a two-tier gold price system. 187 This system permitted the free market 
17S. [d. at 361. 
179. See SoLOMON, supra note 15, at 9-IS. 
ISO. See FRIEDMAN & SCHWARTZ, supra note 18, at 606. 
lSI. See SOLOMON, supra note 15, at 34-36; R. MILLER, ECONOMICS TODAY 697 (3d ed. 1979). 
182. New York Times, June 19, 19S0, at Dl, DIl, cols. 2, 3. 
183. Exec. Order No. 10905, 26 Fed. Reg. 321 (1961). 
184. Exec. Order No. 11037, 27 Fed. Reg. 6967 (1962). 
185. See SOLOMON, supra note 15, at Il4-19; LoWENFELD, supra note 15, at 91-9S. 
I S6. See note 15 supra. 
IS7. In the fall of 1961, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, together with the Bank of England 
and a number of European central banks concluded a "gentleman's agreement" establishing the 
London Gold Pool. LoWENFELD, supra note 15, at 93-94 (citing The London Gold Marhet, 4 BANK OF ENG. 
Q. BULL. 16 (1964». The Pool bought and sold gold in the London market with the purpose of 
stabilizing the market price of gold in the world. The United States contributed half of the Pool's 
requirement of gold, the rest coming from the other nations in fixed proportions. In the first six years 
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price of gold to move higher than the official, fixed monetary price of $35 an 
ounce. 188 
Despite the two-tier system, the United States was unable to support the dollar 
relative to gold. 189 President Nixon temporarily suspended the convertibility of 
the dollar into gold for foreign nations in 1971.190 He followed this action by 
increasing the dollar price of gold to $38 per ounce, which amounted to an eight 
percent devaluation of the dollar. 191 Less than two years later, President Nixon 
raised the official price of gold to $42.22, where it has remained. 192 
In the following years, Congress took several steps towards allowing private 
ownership of gold. In 1973, Congress passed legislation giving the President the 
discretionary authority to legalize the private ownership of gold upon a showing 
that legalization would not "adversely affect the United States' international 
monetary position."193 President Nixon chose not to exercise this option, how-
ever.194 In the following year, Congress enacted legislation which permitted the 
of its operations, the Pool accomplished its purpose without any singificant drain on the members' gold 
holdings. The British devaluation of November 1967, however, among other factors, reversed the 
Pool's long-held position as a net buyer of gold. See generally LOWENFELD, surpa note 15, at 91-94. The 
Pool paid out around $2.5 bi11ion from November 18, 1967 to March 15, 1968, an estimated $1 billion of 
that in the first two weeks of March. 
Faced with the alternative that the United States would end completely its commitment to 
buy and sell gold, the central bankers took a step at their meeting in Washington that many 
economists had long urged (and others had opposed with equal vehemence). They now agreed 
to distinguish officially between two kinds of transactions in gold - those between central 
banks to settle accounts or change the composition of their reserves, and the rest, generally (at 
least in form) private transactions. Until April 1968, the monetary authorities of the leading 
countries had done their best to see to it that the price at which the two kinds of transactions 
were carried on was the same. Now they agreed that no efforts should be made to maintain the 
parity between official and private transactions. The United States, the other Gold Pool 
countries, and the IMF would continue to conduct their official dealings at $35 per ounce. But 
they would not promise to buy gold from non-official holders or to make gold available to 
them. Monetary authorities would no longer be concerned with the supply of gold for 
non-official transactions, and the price of gold in such transactions would be left to seek its own 
level like that of any other commodity. 
[d. at 95-96 (discussing communique issued by Governors of Central Bank and statement by Pierre-Paul 
Schweitzer, Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund). See generally SoLOMoN,supra note 
15, at 114-24. 
188. See generally SOLOMON, supra note 15, at 114-19. 
189. A variety of factors contributed to an abrupt reversal of the U.S. balance of payments position in 
early 1970.Id. at 176-87. 
190. President Nixon announced on radio and television that the United States would no longer 
convert foreign-held dollars into gold or other reserve assets "except in amounts and conditions 
determined to be in the interest of monetary stability and in the best interests of the United States." 
Address of President Richard Nixon, 7 WEEKLY COMPo PREs. Doc. 1170 (Aug. 15, 1971). Technically, the 
decision took the form of notification to the IMF that the United States would no longer freely buy and 
sell gold for the settlement of international transactions. LoWENFELD, supra note 15, at 128 n.D. 
191. COCHRAN, supra note 4, at 50. 
192. [d. 
193. Act of Sept. 21,1973, Pub. L. No. 93-110, 87 Stat. 352, repealed by Act of Oct. 19,1976, Pub. L. 
No. 94-564, § 6, 90 Stat. 2661. 
194. See Holzer, supra note 17. 
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private ownership and holding of gold after December 31, 1974,195 or sooner if 
the President reported to Congress that earlier legalization "would not harm the 
international monetary system or the United States."196 On August 15, 1974, 
President Ford signed this bill into law, ending the forty year ban on private gold 
ownership.197 
The private ownership of gold is a privilege, not a right. Congress revoked the 
privilege of private ownership in 1933 and restored it in 1974. Congress could 
easily revoke the privilege again. In fact, at no time during this century has the 
U.S. government recognized the right of private gold ownership.19B The Trad-
ing With the Enemy Act,199 which President Roosevelt invoked in 1933 to restrict 
private gold transactions,20o remains law. 201 The government could reactivate 
the machinery, which the Trading With the Enemy Act established, to imple-
ment gold confiscation. 202 
d. The Gold MedaUion Act 
For several years, the U.S. Treasury conducted sales of U.S. gold reserves in 
order to strengthen the value of the dollar overseas.203 The Treasury, however, 
has not sold all of the U.S. gold stockpile at market price because of the 
continuing important role of gold as a monetary reserve. As C. Fred Bergsten, 
Assistant Secretary for International Affairs, Department of the Treasury told 
Congress: 
The international agreements that have been reached on demoneti-
zation of gold have very explicitly envisioned gradual phasing out 
over time. [Sale of the gold stock] may happen but I think it's 
essential for us to maintain flexibility in the pace at which we do sell 
the U.S. gold stock.204 
195. Act of Aug. 15,1974, Pub. L. No. 93-373, 88 Stat. 445 (codified at 31 U.S.C. § 442 n. (1976». 
196. [d. 
197. [d. 
198. Holzer, supra note 17. 
199. Trading With the Enemy Act, ch. 106,40 Stat. 411 (1917) (codified at 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-6, 
7-39,41-44 (1917)). 
200. See note 148 and accompanying text supra. 
201. See Trading with the Enemy Act, ch. 106, § 5(b), 40 Stat. 411 (1917) (codified at 12 U.S.C. 95(a) 
(1976)). 
202. See Holzer, supra note 17. 
203. See SOLOMON, supra note 15, at 105-06. J. GoLD, SDRs, GoLD AND CURRENCIES: THIRD SURVEY OF 
NEW LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS 41 (1979). Treasury sales of gold are related to the Gold Reserve Act and 
the official price of gold set under the Act. Gold Reserve Act of 1934, ch. 6, § 2(a), 48 Stat. 337 (1934) 
(codified at 31 U.S.C. §§ 441, 490 (1976)). The Treasury uses part of the proceeds equal to the official 
price to retire gold certificates. The balance goes into the general account of the Treasury. 
204. Hearings bifore the Comm. on Banking, Huusingand UrbanAJJairson S.2843, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 37 
(1978) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings]. 
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While the U.S. Government sold gold overseas to support the dollar, Americans 
imported a wide variety of foreign gold coins and bullion.205 This offset the 
benefit of the Treasury sales of gold to the U.S. balance of payments. 206 
Congress confronted this problem by enacting the Gold Medallion Act of 
1978. 207 The Gold Medallion Act provides for the minting and sale of one-half 
ounce and one ounce gold medallions from the reserves of the U.S. Treasury. 208 
The Act has two main objectives: (1) to permit U.S. citizens to buy and hold gold 
for investment purposes in relatively small amounts;209 and (2) to compete with 
the Krugerrand and other foreign gold coins, so that less gold is imported into 
the United States and fewer dollars are exported.210 
Although the current policy of the Congress is to demonetize the role of gold 
in the economy,211 Congress, by enacting the American Arts Gold Medallion Act, 
recognized that many investors still attribute monetary qualities to gold.212 Con-
gress has not condemned or condoned this position.213 Congress has recognized 
that many Americans, lacking confidence in paper currency, have exported U.S. 
dollars abroad to purchase foreign gold coin and bullion in order to hedge 
against inflation,214 and has responded with the passage of the Gold Medallion 
Act. In acting to improve U.S. balance of payments through the American Arts 
Gold Medallion Act, Congress continues to exercise its power to regulate money 
and coin. Inherent in this power is the authority to define "money" and "coin." 
4. Comity Among Nations 
The concept of comity among nations is another factor which militates against 
state taxation of transactions involving the currency of foreign nations. The 
usual definition of comity is "the recognition which one nation allows within its 
territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation, having 
due regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its 
own citizens or of other persons who are under the protection of its laws."215 
Comity, as a legal concept, represents a mode of state behavior. 216 It does not 
205. [d. (statement of Sen. Hatch). 
206. [d. (statement of Sen. Gam). 
207. American Arts Gold Medallions Act, Pub. L. No. 95-630,92 Stat. 3679 (1978). 
208. [d. § 402. 
209. Senate Hearings, supra note 204, at 37 (statement of Sen. Helms). 
210. [d. (statement of Sen. Hayakawa). 
211. [d. (statement of C. Fred Bergsten, assistant secretary for International Affairs, Deparment of 
the Treasury). 
212. [d. (statement of Sen. Lugar). 
213. [d. (statement of Sen. Helms). 
214. See id. 
215. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895). 
216. L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAw 34 n. I (8th ed. H. Lauterpacht ed. 1955). 
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involve absolute binding legal obligations; neither does it involve mere courtesy 
and good wil1.217 The U.S. Supreme Court has long recognized the concept of 
comity on the "broad ground that international law is founded upon mutuality 
and reciprocity."218 
The executive branch of the federal government, through the Treasury De-
partment, recognizes this principle impliedly through actions and explicitly 
through public statement. During the Senate hearings on the American Arts 
Gold Medallions Act, Chairman William Proxmire questioned the U.S. Treasury 
Representative as follows: 
THE CHAIRMAN. Why does the U.S. Government classify the 
Kruggerand as a coin for customs purposes? If it were classified as a 
medallion it would cost duty and would discourage sales, wouldn't it? 
MR. BERGSTEN. (Asst. Secy. for IntI. Affairs, U.S. Dept. of Trea-
sury). The reason is, it is defined by the issuing government as a coin. 
We have respected that in our tariff classification as does practically 
every other country in the world in their tariff classification. We have 
looked at that and seen what other countries do and they follow that 
same practice. It's a simple matter of accepting at face value what the 
producer says his product is.219 
This special tariff treatment of gold coin and bullion supports the conclusion 
that these items are subject to uniform federal regulation, and that the states 
cannot collect sales taxes on transactions in these items. The U.S. government 
makes all policy decisions with respect to national monetary affairs and all 
international affairs, including monetary affairs. Its special tariff treatment of 
foreign gold coin and bullion is consistent with the power of the U.S. govern-
ment to control all kinds of money, coin or currency, foreign or domestic, 
including bullion, in the interest of monetary uniformity. 
5. Sole Federal Authority 
The principle of federalism contained in the Constitution with respect to the 
regulation of money and foreign coin cannot be outweighed by state desire to tax 
transactions in foreign gold coin and bullion. Coin which is declared by its 
country of origin to be legal tender is money, and only the federal government 
can regulate it. The argument arises that such coins are not in fact money 
because no one and no market actually ever uses such coins as money. The 
principle of comity among nations, however, should prevent the United States or 
any state from unilaterally determining that such coins are not money where the 
217. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. at 163-64. 
218. [d. at 228. See also The Paquette Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900). 
219. See Senate Hearing, supra note 204, at 38. 
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country of origin has by specific legislation determined that these COInS are 
money. 
Where coins are not declared to be legal tender, or where gold is in the form of 
bullion, history and tradition compel leaving the regulation of these items solely 
with the federal government. Since all consideration of gold as money has not 
absolutely ceased, the possibility, however unlikely at the present time, continues 
to exist that the United States could again consider gold to be a major form of 
money. The federal government should maintain sole authority over the regula-
tion of gold coin and bullion. 
III. IMPROPER INTRUSION INTO CONGRESSIONAL POWER TO REGULATE 
COMMERCE WITH FOREIGN NATIONS 
A. Congressional Jurisdiction to Regulate Commerce with Foreign Nations 
"Congress shall have power ... to regulate commerce with foreign nations, 
and among the several states .... "220 This clause of the U.S. Constitution gives 
the federal government the exclusive power to regulate foreign commerce.221 
Although the Constitution grants Congress the power to regulate both interstate 
and foreign commerce in parallel phrases, the evidence suggests "that the Foun-
ders intended the scope of the foreign commerce power to be greater."222 U.S. 
Supreme Court cases, stressing the need for uniformity in the treatment of other 
nations, echo this distinction.223 States may exercise authority over foreign com-
220. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
221. Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 12 U.S. (I How.) 299, 316-17, (1851). 
222. Japan Line Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 448 n. 12 (1979). E.g., THE FEDERALIST 
No. 42, at 279·83. 1I. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961); 3 M. FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL 
CONVENTION OF 1787, at 478 U. Madison) (1911). See Note, State Taxation of International Air Carriers, 57 
Nw. U.L. REv. 92, 101, & n.42 (1962); Note, State Taxation of lnternatianal Air Transportation, 11 STAN. L. 
REv. 518, 525-26 & n.29 (1959); Abel, The Commerce Clause in the Constitutional Conventian and in 
Cantemporary Comment, 25 MINN. L. REv. 432, 465-75 (1941) (concluded, after an exhaustive survey of 
contemporary materials that "[d]espite the formal parallelism of the grants, there is no tenable reason 
for believing that anywhere nearly so large a range of action was given over commerce 'among the 
several states' as over that 'with foreign nations.''' ld. at 475). 
223. Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 448 n.13. E.g., Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U.S. 470, 492-93 (1904) 
("exclusive and absolute" power of Congress over foreign commerce); Bowman v. Chicago & N.R. Co., 
125 U.S. 465, 482 (1888) ("It may be argued [that] the inference to be drawn from the absence of 
legislation by Congress on the subject excludes state legislation affecting commerce with foreign nations 
more strongly than that affecting commerce among the States. Laws which concern the exterior 
relations of the United States with other nations and governments are general in their nature, and 
should proceed exclusively from the legislative authority of the nation."); Henderson v. Mayor of New 
York, 92 U.S. 259, 273 (1876) (regulation "must of necessity be national in its character" when it affects 
"a subject which concerns our international relations, in regard to which foreign nations ought to be 
considered and their rights respected"); Gibbons v. Ogden, 14 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824) Oohnson, J., 
concurring). See also Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. United States, 286 U.S. 427, 434 (1932). In 
National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), the Court noted that Congress' power to 
regulate interstate commerce may be restricted by considerations of federalism and state sovereignty. 
The Court did not suggest that Congress' power to regulate foreign commerce could be so limited. 
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merce only where such exercise is not repugnant to the idea that only a single 
authority should exist. 224 Thus a discussion of the foreign commerce power must 
distinguish between what is purely foreign commerce and what is merely con-
nected to the general subject of commerce with foreign nations.225 
Where the exercise of power is intimately connected with the subject of 
foreign commerce, Congressional power over the area is exclusive.226 In other 
situations, however, Congress and the states hold the general commerce power 
concurrently.227 
B. Gold is Intimately Connected With Foreign Commerce 
For centuries, people throughout the world have used gold as money.228 For 
much of its history, the United States linked the value of its currency to the value 
of gold.229 The international monetary system has also been closely linked with 
this most precious of metals. 
In broad terms, the international monetary system involves the management 
of three processes: (1) the adjustment of balance-of-payments positions, includ-
224. See Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 12 U.S. (1 How.) at 317-18. Several cases deal with the 
constitutional question as to the extent of a state's power to regulate foreign commerce. See, e.g.,fapan 
Line, 441 U.S. at 434; Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276 (1976); K.S.B. Technical Sales Corp. 
v. North Jersey Dist. Water SupplyComm'n, 75 N.J. 272, 381 A.2d 774 (1977), appeal dismissed, 435 U.S. 
982 (1978). Bruwn v. Maryland held invalid a state law requiring an importer of foreign goods to obtain a 
state license for a fee on the grounds that federal control of foreign commerce is exclusive. 25 U.S. (12 
Wheat.) 419 (1827). Modern decisions also preclude any state regulation of foreign imports or exports. 
See japan Line, 441 U.S. at 452. See also Michelin Tire, 423 U.S. at 285. In japan Line, the California 
Supreme Court held that the state could not levy a property tax on cargo containers owned by Japanese 
shipping companies that were temporarily in California ports. japan Line, 441 U.S. at 453-54. The 
Court indicated that, in contrast to situations involving interstate commerce, state interests have little 
relevance where foreign commerce is concerned. Id. at 455-56. The court stated: "If other states follow 
California's example ... foreign-owned containers will be subjected to various degrees of multiple 
taxation, depending on which American ports they enter. This result, obviously would make speaking 
with one voice impossible." Id. at 453. In Michelin Tire, the Court relied upon the import-export clause 
of the U.S. Constitution (art. I, § 10, cl. 2) to support the federal government's foreign commerce 
power. 423 U.S. at 283. The Court stated that a state tax which discriminates against foreign products 
undermines a uniform U.S. trade policy.Id. at 285. See japan Line, 441 U.S. at 453. 
225. See Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 12 U.S. (1 How.) at 316-19. 
226. Id. at 316-17. 
227. Id. 
228. /d. The Keeper of Coins at the Ashmolean Museum of Oxford University begins the preface to 
his monograph on gold as follows: 
The number of single substances which have held the attention of man in every age, recorded 
or remembered, is not large. Most of them have been the simplest and most basic necessities of 
life: flour to eat, clay for bricks with which to build houses, wool for warm clothing, copper and 
iron for implements, and timber for a thousand constructional purposes. Gold does not come 
into the category of simple and basic necessities. 
C. SUTHERLAND, GoLD, ITS BEAUTY, POWER AND ALLURE 8, quoted in Gold, Gold in International Monetary 
Law: Change Uncertainty and Ambiguity, 15 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 323 [hereinafter cited as Gold in 
International Monetary Law]. 
229. See note 15 and accompanying text supra. 
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ing the establishment and alteration of exchange rates; (2) the financing of 
payments imbalances among countries by the use of credit or reserves; and 
(3) the provision of international money (reserves).230 Immediately following 
World War II, as part of the International Monetary Fund system, the United 
States supplied or absorbed dollar reserves through its buying or selling of gold 
in transactions with foreign monetary authorities.231 Despite changes in the IMF 
system, which resulted in today's system of floating exchange rates, gold is still a 
major portion of the monetary stockpiles of most nations.232 
The International Monetary Fund came into existence under the Articles of 
Agreement adopted at the United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference, 
at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire.233 The original 1944 IMF Articles con-
tinued using gold as the foundation of the international monetary system by 
defining currency convertibility in terms of gold: "The Fund ... may deem 
holdings of the currency of [members] which carry specified rights of conversion 
into another currency or into gold to be holdings of convertible currency for the 
purpose of the calculation of monetary reserves. "234 The Original Articles of 
Agreement provided for an official price of gold.230 The IMF required individ-
ual members who wished their currency to be considered convertible in the Fund 
to deposit gold valued at the official price with the IMF.236 This deposited gold 
served as the Fund's asset reserve for currency exchange. 237 
The Original Articles also tied the concept of the convertibility of a nation's 
currency to the willingness of that nation to exercise the undertakings of Article 
VIII(2)(3) and (4) by not placing restrictions on payments and transactions for 
current international transactions. 238 The Articles provided that "[a] member's 
230. See SOLOMON, sufrra note 15, at 6. 
231. See Id. at IS-20; Gold in International Monetary Law, sUfrra note 22S, at 324-25. 
232. See id. at 264-S9, 333-34; Gold in International Monetary Law, sUfrra note 22S, at 363. See also note 
275 and accompanying text infra. 
233. Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, Dec. 7,1945,60 Stat. 1401, T.I.A.S. 
No. 1501,2 V.N.T.S. 39 (1947) [hereinafter cited as Original Articles], amended July 2S, 1969,20 V.S.T. 
2775, T.I.A.S. No. 674S, 726 V.N.T.S. 266 (1976) [hereinafter cited as First Amendment], and Apr. I, 
1975, IMF Board of Governors Res. No. 31-4 [hereinafter cited as Second Amendment]. The president 
was given authority to accept membership for the Vnited States in the International Monetary Fund by 
Act of July 31,1945, ch. 339 § 2, 59 Stat. 512 (codified at 22 V.S.C. § 286 (1945)). 
234. Original Articles, sUfrra note lOS, art. XIX (g) (emphasis added). The Original Articles also 
defined "a member's monetary reserves" in terms of gold. Id. art. XIX (a). 
235. "The Fund Shall prescribe a margin above and below par value for transactions in gold ... and 
no member shall buy gold at a price above par value plus the prescribed margin, or sell gold at a price 
below par value minus the prescribed margin." Id. art. IV(2). 
236. Id. art. III(3)(b). 
237. Id. art. IV (S)(a). See COCHRAN, sufrra note 4, at 54S; J. GoLD, SDRs, GoLD AND CURRENCIES 6 
(IMF Pamphlet No. 26,1979); SoLOMON, sUfrra note 15, at 114-19. 
23S. Consonant with the IMF's purpose to "facilitate the expansion and balanced growth of interna-
tional trade," Original Articles, sUfrra note lOS, art. I (ii), and to "assist in the establishment of a 
multilateral system of payments in respect of current transactions between members and in the 
elimination of foreign exchange restrictions which hamper the growth of world trade," Id. art. I (iv), the 
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holdings of convertible currencies means its holdings of the currencies of other 
members which are not availing themselves of the transitional arrangements 
under Article XIV, Section 2 .... "239 
During the period soon after World War II the IMF served as the official 
international market for currency exchange between certain nations.24o The 
IMF and its gold reserves helped support international trade by nations with 
war-damaged currencies through the establishment of a system of international 
credit.241 The United States, in turn, supported this system by continuing its 
policy of converting dollars into gold in both the marketplace and in transactions 
with other nations.242 This system temporarily kept the price of gold relatively 
stable and maintained international confidence in the dollar. 
IMF requires each member to undertake to: (1) avoid restrictions on the making of payments and 
transfers for international transactions; (2) avoid discriminatory currency practices; and (3) buy bal-
ances of its currency held by another member if the latter represents that it acquired the balances as the 
result of current transactions or that conversion is necessary in order to make payments for current 
transactions. /d. art. VIII (2)(3) and (4). "The buying member shall have the option to pay either in the 
currency of the member making the request or in gold."ld. art. VIII (4). These obligations define the 
concept of "market convertibility," which the parties intended to retain through each of the ensuing 
Amendments to the IMF Articles. Gold, Converlibk Currency Clauses, 13 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 241, 244 
(1979) [hereinafter cited as Gold]. Market convertibility was possible after many members "had relaxed 
exchange controls, abandoned the compulsory centralization of foreign exchange, and permitted 
dealings in foreign exchange through commercial channels." Id. at 245. The IMF defined the term 
"payments for current transactions" as: 
payments which are not for the purpose of transferring capital, and includes, without limita-
tion: 
(1) All payments due in connection with foreign trade, other current business, including 
services, and normal short-term banking and credit facilities; 
(2) Payments due as interest on loans and as net income from other investments; 
(3) Payments of moderate amount for amortization of loans or for depreciation of direct 
investments; 
(4) Moderate remittances for family living expenses. 
Original Articles, supra note 233, art. XIX(i). 
239. Original Articles, supra note 233, art. XIX(d). The quoted reference to Article XIV(2) refers to 
that provision which allows members who, because of their post-World War II economic difficulties, 
cannot freely comply with the undertaking to not restrict payments and transactions for current 
international transactions. See note 238 supra. These members may temporarily restrict such payments. 
Such action, however, renders that nation's currency nonconvertible. Original Articles, supra note 233, 
art. XIX(d). 
240. See COCHRAN, supra note 4, at 547. See generally SoWMON, supra note 15, at 1-33, 114-19. 
Exch,anges between nations include transactions with the central banks or treasuries ofthose nations.ld. 
241. SoLOMON, supra note 15, at 9-20. 
242. Id. at 114-19. From 1934 on, the United States had promised to sell gold for dollars and dollars 
for gold to foreign monetary authorities at the fixed prices of $35 an ounce, and this commitment had 
been incorporated into the arrangements made at Bretton Woods. LoWENFELD, supra note 15. at 93. 
The action closest to a formal commitment, prior to the IMF Agreement. was a statement by the 
Secretary of the Treasury, in 1934, on the occasion of the fixing of the new weight of the gold dollar 
pursuant to the Gold Reserve Act of 1934, ch. 6, § 2(a), 48 Stat. 337 (codified at 31 U.S.C. § 408a (1976». 
which provided: "In connection with the announcement today [Proclamation No. 2072, reprinted in 48 
Stat. 1730 (1934)] that the Treasury will buy gold, the Secretary of the Treasury states that, until further 
notice. he will also sell gold for export to foreign central banks whenever our exchange rates with gold 
standard currencies reach export point." 20 FED. RESERVE BULL. 69 (1934). quoted in LoWENFELD, supra 
note 15. at 135 n,g. The Presidential Proclamation to which the Secretary's announcement referred 
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The 1967 devaluation of the British pound,243 however, precipitated a major 
world loss of confidence in the dollar.244 In response to the first rush on gold 
immediately after devaluation - about $580 million in the week of November 
20-24, 1967 - the governors of the central banks of seven nations announced a 
series of reciprocal credit arrangements designed "to ensure by coordinated 
action orderly conditions in the exchange markets and to support the present 
pattern of exchange rates based on the fixed price of $35 per ounce of gold."245 
Although this action was successful in reducing the worldwide sale of sterling 
and dollars for a short time, the United States still faced an unacceptable 
continuing depletion of its gold reserves into 1968.246 In March 1968, the United 
States repealed its promise to back privately-held dollars by gold,247 and the 
international banking community announced the cessation of its efforts to main-
tain the parity between the official and private prices of gold.248 
Meanwhile, another problem of the international monetary system had been 
occupying economists and political leaders for close to a decade. Although the 
framers of the original IMF Agreement sought to promote exchange stability, to 
minimize artificial restraints on international transactions, and to assist nations 
with balance of payments difficulties by creating a pool of assets that could be 
drawn on for temporary periods, nothing in the Articles of Agreement provided 
said: "This proclamation shall remain in force and effect until and unless repealed or modified by act of 
Congress or by subsequent proclamation; and notice is hereby given that I reserve the right by virtue of 
the authority vested in me to alter or modify this proclamation as the interest of the United States may 
seem to require." Id. 
On May 20, 1949, Secretary of the Treasury John W. Snyder wrote to the Managing Director of the 
IMF as follows: 
/d. 
My Dear Mr. Gut!: In connection with the obligations of members of the International 
Monetary Fund under Article IV, Section 4(b), of the Articles of Agreement of the Fund, I 
wish to advise you that the Government of the United States, for the settlement of international 
transactions, in fact freely buys and sells gold within the limits prescribed by the Fund under 
Article IV, Section 2. The policy of the United States in this respect has not been changed since 
prior to the signing and entry into force of the Articles of Agreement. 
President Kennedy gave a personal pledge to maintain his country's official price of gold in his first 
State of the Union message on January 30, 1961. President's State of the Union Message, (1961) PUB. 
PAPERS 21, item 11 (Jan. 30,1961). He amplified the pledge in a Special Message on Gold and the 
Balance of Payments a week later. Id. at pp. 59-60, item 23. See LoWENFELD, supra note 15, at 135-36. 
243. See generally LOWENFELD, supra note 15, at 45-82. 
244. See generally Uf. at 91-93. Since the United States was prepared to convert dollars held by foreign 
official holders into gold without limit at a fixed rate, foreigners could express a lack of confidence in 
the dollar by selling dollars for gold. A country's own currency does not form part of that country's 
reserves, so an exchange of gold for dollars meant a reduction in the United States' reserves. !d. at 92. 
245. N.Y. Times, Nov. 27, 1967, at 1, col. 6-7; at 79, col. 3-5, quoted in id., at 92-93. These nations 
created short term reciprocal credit lines whereby, for example, the Bank of England could draw a 
given amount of dollars from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and the Federal Reserve Board 
could draw a corresponding amount of pounds from the Bank of England. Id. at 73. 
246. See LoWENFELD, supra note 15, at 92-95. 
247. See note 15 supra. 
248. See note 187 supra. 
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for growth in reserve assets in proportion to increase in overall economic activ-
ity.249 Many economists and monetary authorities of the international monetary 
system thought, in the 1960's, that world reserves were deficient in several 
respects. First, the total of world reserves was not keeping up with the total of 
economic activity. By 1967, the ratio of world reserves to the volume of imports 
had declined from about fifty-seven percent, in 1958, to thirty-seven percent. 
Notwithstanding the United States, whose reserves were declining as other 
nations' reserves were growing, world trade measured by imports increased in 
the period from 1950-1966 by about eight percent per year, while reserves 
increased by only five and one-half percent per year. Second, by 1967, nations 
held over forty percent of world reserves in the form of dollars and sterling, both 
currencies increasingly becoming a cause for anxiety. Third, the gold compo-
nent of reserves depended in large part on production decisions by South Africa, 
on industrial uses, and on purchases by hoarders and speculators, none of which 
"bore any rational relation to the needs of the world economy."250 
In response to these problems, the members and Board of Governors of the 
IMF passed the First Amendment to the Articles, effective in 1969.251 The First 
Amendment's main objective was to replace the traditional reserve assets with 
"Special Drawing Rights" (SDRs),252 a new unit of international exchange which 
the IMF could allocate to members in order to provide them with a supplement 
to existing reserve assets and, in this way, meet the long-term global need for 
reserves.253 Under the plan, a country in deficit could use SDRs to settle its 
accounts by selling them to a country designated by the Fund. The designated 
country would be obligated to take the SDRs and to provide, in return, convert-
ible currency, which the country in deficit could then use to extinguish foreign 
balances.254 
In answer to the question of which currency the designated nation could 
provide in return for the SDRs which the IMF forced it to accept, the First 
Amendment created a new concept of convertibility, "currency convertible in 
fact."255 
Currency convertible in fact means: 
(1) ... the currency of a participant that 
(i) has accepted the obligations of Article VII, Sections 2, 3, 
and 4, or 
249. See LoWENFELD, supra note 15, at 101-104. 
250. [d. at 102-03. 
251. See note 233 supra. 
252. First Amendment, supra note 233. Intro. Art. (i). Gold. supra note 238. at 245. 
253. [d. First Amendment. supra note 233. art. XXIV(i); Gold. supra note 238. at 248. 
254. Gold. supra note 238. at 248. First Amendment. supra note 233. art. xxv. LoWENFELD. supra note 
15. at 105. 
255. Gold. supra note 238. at 248. 
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(ii) for the settlement of international transactions in fact freely 
buys and sells gold within the [par value] limits prescribed by the 
Fund .... 256 
329 
The First Amendment retained the definition of currency convertibility, in 
terms of either gold or of an undertaking to comply with Article VIII(2)(3) and 
(4), as defined in the Original Agreement. 257 The value of SDRs was, according 
to the First Amendment, to be equal to 0.888671 gram of fine gold,258 then 
precisely equal to one U.S. dollar at its rate of $35 per ounce.259 
The Second Amendment of the IMF Articles of Agreement, which took effect 
in 1978,260 had the two main objectives of gradually reducing the role of gold in 
the international monetary system and of advancing the SDR to the position of 
principal reserve asset in the system.261 The Second Amendment eliminated any 
definition of currency convertibility, producing "what might seem to be the 
strange result that the central legal instrument of the international monetary 
system contains no formal definition of a convertible currency."262 This devel-
opment occurred because the distinction between the currencies that met the 
definition of convertibility and those that did not ceased to be necessary in the 
financial activities of the IMF.263 Furthermore, the United States pushed for the 
elimination of the definition because after August 15, 1971, when it repudiated 
official convertibility of the U.S. dollar into gold,264 the United States wanted to 
avoid any express or implied obligation to resume official convertibility under 
Article VIJ.265 
The language of convertibility survived, in the Second Amendment, only in 
Article VIII(4).266 Joseph Gold, then-General Counsel and Director of the IMF's 
Legal Department,267 explained the reason that the Second Amendment re-
tained that Article, with its references to convertibility: "[T]he explanation is that 
some other members were unwilling to ~ppear to concur in the demise of the 
official convertibility of the U.S. dollar .... "268 
256. First Amendment, sufrra note 233, art. XXXII(b). 
257. For a discussion of Article VIII (2), (3), & (4), see note 238 and accompanying text sUfrra. 
258. Gold, sUfrra note 238, at 252; First Amendment, sufrra note 233, art. XXI(2). 
259. Gold, sUfrra note 238, at 253. LoWENFELD, sUfrra note 15, at 189. 
260. Gold, sufrra note 238, at 253. See note 233 supra. 
261. Solomon, sufrra note 15, at 72. Second Amendment, sufrra note 233, art. VIII(7); Gold in 
International Monetary Law, supra note 228, at 351-52. 
262. Gold, supra note 238, at 252. 
263. Gold, sUfrra note 238, at 40, 252. The fact that the currency of a member did not meet the 
definition did not necessarily mean that the member was in a weak balance of payments and reserve 
position. Id. 
264. See note 15 sUfrra. 
265. Gold, sUfrra note 238, at 252. 
266. See note 238, sufrra. 
267. Gold now holds the title of Senior Consultant to the IMF. 
268. Gold, sUfrra note 238, at 253. 
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In place of "currency convertible in fact," the Second Amendment created the 
new concept of "freely useable currency," meaning: "a member's currency that 
the Fund determines (i) is, in fact, widely used to make payments for interna-
tional transactions, and (ii) is widely traded in the principal exchange mar-
kets."269 The Fund determined that, initially, the freely useable currencies were 
the German mark, French franc, Japanese yen, pound sterling and U.S. dol-
lar. 270 
The SDR is no longer defined in terms of gold, but the Second Amendment 
authorizes the IMF to determine the method of its valuation.271 Joseph Gold 
explained this development as follows: 
Even before the Second Amendment, the Fund found, after the 
withdrawal by the United States of its undertaking to buy and sell 
gold freely,272 that there was no currency that had a gold value and 
therefore no currency that could be the medium for determining the 
exchange rates of currency in relation to the SDR.273 
All three versions ofthe IMF Articles of Agreement have dealt specifically with 
gold. The legal role of gold was central to the original articles. Although this role 
declined under the First and Second Amendments, "[t]he legal changes have not 
added to the Decalogue the commandment that thou shalt not covet gold. 
Although gold may not reconquer the legal ground it has lost, it cannot be 
dismissed as irrelevant in international monetary affairs."274 According to 
Joseph Gold: 
It is a widespread view among members that gold continues to be a 
reserve asset and continues to have monetary functions. This view 
persists notwithstanding the change in the legals status of gold and 
the absence of its use in official settlements or in support of curren-
cies. Gold is still a reserve asset that is desired by many members, not 
only because it has appreciated in value and may appreciate further, 
but also because it gives a sense of confidence to its owners and to 
269. Second Amendment, supra note 233, art. XXX(f). 
270. Decision No. 5719-(78-46), Mar. 31, 1978, [1978] IMF ANN. REp. 127, cited in Gold,supra note 
238, at 256 n.36. 
271. The IMF approved a system, effective July I, 1974, whereby the value of the SDR would be 
based on a "basket of 16 currencies," weighted roughly in proportion to the exports of goods and 
services on the part of the countries that issued them. Decision No. 4233-(74167) S2 of June 13, 1974, 
summarized in 3 IMF SURVEY 177 (1974), 3 IMF SURVEY 209 (1974), reprinted in [1974] IMF ANN. REp. 
116. "Thus, as currencies floated up and down against one another, the value of the SDR would remain 
in the center, appreciating against the weaker and depreciating against the strong. By definition, the 
SDR's value would remain constant in terms of all of the currencies composing the basket." LOWENFELD, 
supra note 15, at 190. 
272. See note 15 supra. 
273. Gold in International Monetary Law, supra note 228, at 353-54. 
274. ld. at 324. 
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others. According to unofficial reports, some monetary authorities in 
the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and Latin America have purchased 
gold in the market in order to diversify their reserves. The continu-
ing attitude to gold is no surprise to the drafters of the Second 
Amendment, because, as realists, their objective did not go beyond a 
gradual reduction in the role of gold.275 
331 
The participants in the European Monetary System have made an interesting 
new use of gold. Each participant in the exchange rate and intervention ar-
rangements of that System must contribute twenty percent of its gold holdings to 
the European Monetary Cooperation Fund in return for European Currency 
Units. 276 The next stage of the System's development involves a "final transfer" 
of contributed reserve assets to a central financial authority, "an internationaliza-
tion or centralization of a substantial amount of gold."277 However, Joseph Gold 
points out that "[i]t is said that members of the community are unwilling to make 
an outright alienation of [their] gold."278 Perhaps this unwillingness to alienate 
gold and the related hesitancy in Europe toward the IMF's abandonment of the 
gold standard are both explained in a statement by Robert Solomon, a former 
international economist for the Federal Reserve Board: 
The basis for [the European desire to preserve a significant role 
for gold] is difficult to pin down, for it is never articulated publicly. It 
seems to involve, in the last analysis, a fear that international cooper-
ation may some day founder and the IMF become unworkable or, at 
least, that it might function in a manner inimical to the interests of 
Europe .... In a period of monetary hostility, if worse came to worst, 
the use of [SDRs] could be blocked. This leads them to see the 
preservation of a significant role for gold as a fall-back or fail-safe 
mechanism in the event that international cooperation should give 
way to international monetary enmity. 
Those who hold this view are able to point to the fact that a large 
proportion of the reserves of the United States is already in the form 
of gold. Thus the United States is not taking many risks as to the 
future usability of its reserves. 279 
In fact, Section 405(b) of the Currency Act supports the view that the dollar is 
or might soon be backed by gold. This section provides that: 
The Secretary of the Treasury is authorized to issue gold cer-
tificates in such form and in such denominations as he may deter-
mine, against any gold held by the United States Treasury. [The sole 
275. Id. at 362-63. 
276. See id. at 365-66. 
277. Id. at 366. 
278. Id. 
279. SoLOMON, supra note 15, at 334. 
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limitation is that the] amount of gold certificates issued and outstand-
ing shall at no time exceed the value, at the legal standard provided 
in section 449 of this title on October 19, 1976, of the gold so held 
against gold certificates. 28o 
Although Congress repealed Section 449, effective April 1978,281 Section 405(a) 
remains in effect, and incorporates the former Section 449 standards.282 Section 
449 provided for a valuation of the dollar at $42 2/9 per fine troy ounce of gold. 
It also provided that the par value of the U.S. dollar would be one dollar equals 
SDR .828948.283 While the United States does not currently back its dollar by 
gold,284 the laws of the United States stand ready to support a future return to 
the gold standard. 
Furthermore, Section 449a of the Par Value Modification Act authorizes the 
Treasury Secretary "to maintain the value in terms of gold of the holdings of 
United States dollars of the International Monetary Fund ... to the extent 
provided in the articles of agreement of such institutions."285 Since the Second 
Amendment provides that a member may not maintain the external value of its 
currency in terms of gold,286 the United States may not, due to Section 449a, 
maintain the value of the IMF's dollar holdings in gold.287 Should a future 
change in the IMF Articles provide for a return of the gold standard to the 
international monetary system, existing U.S. law can accommodate that change. 
The Reagan Administration came into office advocating a return to the gold 
standard in both the domestic and international monetary systems. 288 The U.S. 
Treasury dumped gold by auction in the late 1970's, ostensibly to show the world 
that the United States was not dedicated to a policy of retaining gold in its 
reserves,289 but some observers consider this action to be "evidence of a continu-
ing monetary role for gold because the United States was using gold in dealing 
with the deficit in its balance of payments. According to this view, the United 
States was no longer trying to demonstrate the monetary irrelevance of the price 
[of gold] or to undermine the vertiginous rise in price but to take advantage of 
that price in support of the U.S. dollar."290 
280. 31 U.S.C. § 405b (1981) (emphasis added). 
281. 31 U.S.C. § 449 (1976) repealed by Act of Oct. 19, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-564, § 6, 90 Stat. 2661. 
282. 31 U.S.C. § 405(b) (1976); Gold, supra note 238, at 40. 
283. 31 U.S.C. § 449 (1976), repealed by Act ofOet. 6,1976, Pub. L. No. 94-564, § 6, 90 Stat. 2661. 
284. See note 15 supra. 
285. 31 U.S.C. § 449a (1976). 
286. Second Amendment, supra note 233, art. IV(2), (6). 
287. See note 285 and accompanying text supra. 
288. E.g., Farnsworth, Golden Days, N.Y. Times, Dec. 8,1980, at D2, col. 2; Mundell,Goldat$IO,OOO, 
N.Y. Times, Oct. 19, 1980, at D2, col. 5; Silk,Reagan's Gold Advisors, N.Y. Times, Mar. 14, 1980, at D2. 
col. I; Beckner, Gold, Tenacious, Is Still An Either Ore, N.Y. Times, Apr. 25, at 1980, at 27, col. I 
[hereinafter cited as Beckner]. 
289. Gold in International Monetary Law, supra note 228, at 365; Beckner, supra note 288. 
290. Gold in International Monetary Law, supra note 228, at 365 (citing Marsh, A Monetary Renaissance, 
1982] STATE ATTEMPTS TO TAX GOLD 333 
Gold remains a medium of international exchange in spite of a recent U.S. 
policy to demonetarize it and a part of the foundation of the world system of 
commerce. Even if one argues that recent U.S. policy has temporarily removed 
gold from international commerce, gold is nonetheless recognized by the great 
weight of history and by the current laws of the United States as a major factor in 
the valuation of the U.S. dollar. Recent events show the possibility of an upcom-
ing change in the U.S. policy of demonetarization. Such a change would weaken 
any argument that gold is not intimately connected to "commerce with foreign 
nations" under the Constitution. 
C. A State Must Meet a High Standard to Defeat a Challenge Based on Interference with 
Foreign Commerce 
The recent decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in japan Lines, Ltd. v. County of 
Los Angeles 291 addressed the propriety of State taxation of instrumentalities of 
foreign commerce. At issue injapan Lines was the taxation of shipping containers 
used exclusively in foreign commerce. California sought to impose a tax on the 
containers under the state ad valorem property tax.292 
Writing for the majority, Justice Blackmun articulated two tests applicable to 
state taxes on foreign, as opposed to domestic, commerce. First, the Court 
restated the test of Complete Auto Transit v. Brady which requires a showing that: 
(1) the res and taxing state have a substantial nexus to justify taxation; (2) the tax 
is fairly apportioned; and (3) the tax is nondiscriminatory.293 Second, the Court 
held that when a state seeks to tax an instrumentality of foreign commerce, two 
other considerations come into play:294 "first, whether the tax, notwithstanding 
apportionment, creates a substantial risk of international multiple taxation. and, 
second, whether the tax prevents the Federal Government from speaking with 
one voice when regulating commercial relations with foreign governments."295 
Applying these tests, the Court struck down the California tax levied upon the 
containers domiciled in Japan. 296 The Court found that the state tax interfered 
with national policy for federal uniformity, stating, "[i]f other States follow 
California's example (Oregon already has done so), foreign-owned containers 
will be subjected to various degrees of multiple taxation, depending on which 
American ports they enter."297 
Finan. Times of London, June 12. 1979. at 14, Gold, A Myth Comes Back to Life, Financial Times of 
London. Dec. 24, 1979. at 8. 
291. Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 434. 
292. [d. at 43&-37. 
293. Complete Auto Transit Inc. v. Brady. 430 U.S. 274 (1977). 
294. Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 446. 
295. [d. at 451. 
296. [d. at 451-53. 
297. [d. at 453. 
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The Court specifically rejected the three major objections of appellants: 
(1) that any multiple taxation is attributable to Japan's full taxation, rather than 
California's apportioned taxation, of the containers; (2) that multiple taxation 
could be cured by Congressional legislation or international agreement;298 and 
(3) that some overlapping of tax is permissible. 299 In rejecting each of these 
claims, the Court relied upon the fact that the objects sought to be taxed were in 
foreign rather than domestic commerce. The Court stated: 
The premise of appellees' argument is that a State is free to impose 
demonstrable burdens on commerce, so long as Congress has not 
pre-empted the field by affirmative regulation. But it long has been 
"accepted constitutional doctrine that the commerce clause, without 
the aid of Congressional legislation ... affords some protection from 
state legislation inimical to the national commerce, and that in such 
cases, where Congress has not acted, this Court, and not the state 
legislature, is under the commerce clause the final arbiter of the 
competing demands of state and national interests .... " Appellees' 
argument, moreover, defeats, rather than supports, the clause it 
aims to promote. For to say that California has created a problem 
susceptible only of congressional - indeed only of international -
solution is to concede that the taxation of foreign-owned containers 
is an area where a uniform federal rule is essential. California may not 
tell this Nation or Japan how to run their foreign policies. 300 
The Court completely rejected the concept of any permissible overlapping of 
taxes in a foreign commerce context stating that "[t]his case concerns foreign 
commerce. Even a slight overlapping of tax - a problem that might be deemed 
df minimis in a domestic context - assumes importance when sensitive matters of 
foreign relations and national sovereignty are concerned."30I The same reason-
ing applies to collection of sales taxes on transactions involving foreign gold coin 
and bullion. 
D. A State Sales Tax on Foreign Gold Coin and Bullion Cannot Meet the High Standard 
Needed to Outweigh Its Interference With Foreign Commerce 
Japan Lines established five criteria which a State tax must meet to be valid 
when applied to an instrument of foreign commerce: nexus, proper apportion-
ment, nondiscrimination, no risk of multiple taxation, and lack of interference 
in an area requiring uniform federal regulation.302 A sales tax on gold transac-
298. [d. 
299. [d. at 455. 
300. [d. at 454-55 (emphasis added). See also Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 769 
(1945). Accord Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 326 (1979); Boston Stock Exchange v. State Tax 
Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318, 328 (1977). 
30 I. Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 456. 
302. See notes 293-95 and accompanying text supra. 
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tions would satisfy only the first requirement. That is, the transaction of gold coin 
and bullion sales by state resident retailers within the borders of the state would 
constitute proper nexus. 
As for proper apportionment, a sales tax would be apportioned according to 
the number of times that the coin or bullion is sold or traded. Since the use of 
gold coins will presumably always be one of monetary investment, a sales tax 
would not be apportioned according to the taxed item's value or use. 303 Concern-
ing the third criterion, a sales tax might or might not be discriminatory, depend-
ing on whether the tax applies to U.S. gold coins or medallions, and whether it 
distinguishes among various foreign gold coins.304 
Concerning the fourth criterion, the risk of multiple taxation is extreme. The 
very nature of coin and bullion necessitates that these items change hands often. 
Depending on the states in which the gold coin or bullion is sold, it would be 
subjected to various degrees of multiple taxation. Should various states discrimi-
nate in taxing different types and nationalities of gold coins, they could create 
the kind of animosities that Madison in 1787 feared multiple currencies would 
cause. 305 
Finally, taxation of gold coin and bullion is an area reserved for uniform 
federal regulation. State sales taxes interfere with uniformity in this area of 
national concern. State sales taxes also could give rise to retaliatory taxation by 
foreign nations. If one accepts the conclusion that a Krugerrand, because it is 
legal tender, is "currency of the Realm" and thus not taxable, the question arises 
as to whether taxation of a similar non-legal tender Mexican peso would consti-
tute a statement in support of apartheid. Should states be allowed to make these 
kinds of political decisions, whether innocent or intended, the result would be an 
unconstitutional infringement upon the exclusive federal authority established 
under the foreign commerce clause of the U.S. Constitution. 
IV. VIOLATION OF THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON 
TARIFFS AND TRADE (GATT) 
A. The Most-Favored-Nation Principle of Articlel( 1) of GATT 
The United States signed the original General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT) at Geneva on October 30, 1947.306 Today, the GATT has 
303. See Japan Line. 441 U.S. at 445; Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. at 285. See also 
Northwestern Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450 (1959) (a state must apportion its tax in 
accordance with local activities within the state). 
304. Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 445. 
305. THE FEDERALIST No. 44, at 300-01 U. Madison) U. Cooke ed. 1961). See note 36 and accompany-
ing text supra. 
306. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30. 1947.61 Stat. A3, T.I.A.S. No. 1700.55 
U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter cited as GATT]. 
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eighty-three contracting signatories, 3 provisional signatories, and twenty-five 
countries or territories which comply in fact.307 
The explicitly stated purpose of the GATT IS to provide "reciprocal and 
mutually advantageous arrangements directed to the substantial reduction of 
tariffs and other barriers to trade and to the elimination of discriminatory 
treatment in international commerce .... "308 
The primary principle of GATT, which facilitates the accomplishment of 
GATT's stated purposes, is the most-favored-nation principle.309 In its uncondi-
tional form,31o the most-favored-nation principle embodies the situation where 
one country promises to extend to another "the most favorable trade concessions 
it has granted, or may grant, to any third country."311 According to Article 1(1) 
of GA TT, signatories must apply the most-favored-nation principle with respect 
to "customs, duties and charges of any kind imposed on or in connection with 
importation or exportation or imposed on the international transfer of payments 
for imports or exports."312 The most-favored-nation clause provides that "any 
advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by any contracting party to 
any product originating in or destined for any other country shall be accorded 
immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined 
for the territories of all other contracting parties."313 
307. GATT, GATT ACTIVITIES IN 1979 AND CONCLUSION OF THE TOKYO MULTILATERAL TRADE 
NEGOTIATIONS (1973-1979), at 86 (1980). 
308. GATT, supra note 137, preamble. 
309. Hufbauer, Erb & Starr, The GATT Codes and the Unconditional Most-Favored-Nat;;'n Principle, i2 
LAw & POL'y INT'L Bus. 59, 60 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Hufbauer, Erb & Starr]. 
310. There are two "forms" of the most-favored-nation principle, conditional and unconditional. Id. 
at 59. Nations adopting the principle in unconditional form automatically extend trade benefits to "like 
products" of other countries unless the particular country is excluded expressly from the trade benefit. 
SUBCOMM. ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE OF THE SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, 96TH CONG., 1st SESS., MTN 
STUDIES PT. I: AGREEMENTS BEING NEGOTIATED IN THE MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS IN GENEVA 
6 (Comm. Print 1979). Nations adopting the conditional most-favored-nation principle would grant 
trade benefits only on receipt of reciprocal benefits from the other country. Id. 
311. Hufbauer, Erb & Starr. supra note 309, at 59. It i~ important to note that: 
The most-favored-nation clause has not yet crystallised into a rule of international customary 
law. It is pre-eminently an optional standard which derives its validity from the treaties in 
which it is embodied. No state can demand it as a matter of right except on the basis of a treaty 
and it generally operates on the basis of reciprocity. Therefore,' discrimination in matters of 
tariff and trade is not illegal per se, however undesirable it may be from a purely economic or 
political point of view if it does not violate, or deny, rights embodied in a particular treaty. 
Trade discrimination in international law becomes meaningful only in relation to the most-
favored-nation clauses and the principle of non-discrimination contained in various bilateral 
and multilateral treaties. 
K. HYDER, EQUAUTY OF TREATMENT AND TRADE DISCRIMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 33-34 (1968) 
[hereinafter cited as HYDER]. 
312. GATT, supra note 306, art. 1(1). 
313. /d. The language employed in the most-favored-nation clause is not very precise, however, and 
wide latitude for different and often conflicting interpretations exists. HYDER, supra note 3 I I, at 55. 
"For instance, terms like charges of any kind, or any advantage, favor or privilege or immunity, and in 
respect of duties and charges can often be manipulated in such a way as to evade the most-favored-
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A state sales tax on foreign gold coin and bullion violates the most-favored-
nation principle if the tax distinguishes between imports from GATT -con-
tracting parties.314 For example, if a state decides to exempt from tax sales of 
legal tender gold coins like Kruggerands and Canadian Maple Leafs, but to tax 
sales of similar gold coins such as Mexican gold pesos or gold bullion such as 
Swiss bank wafers, a violation of Article 1(1) of GATT occurS. 315 Under the 
most-favored-nation principle, a government must afford equal treatment to 
"like products."316 Discriminatory state treatment of similar foreign goods, such 
as the disparate taxing method for the sale of gold coins, causes the United States 
to be in violation of its commitments under Article I of the GATT.317 
B. The Natinal Treatment Principle of Article III(2) of GATT 
In keeping with its liberalized trade objective, and in order to "preclude the 
dissipation of concessions through restrictive measures imposed after imports 
have entered a country,"318 GATT contains various provisions whose object is to 
limit trade barriers to the duties imposed at the customs boundary .319 The 
provision most relevant to this discussion is Article 111(2), the national treatment 
principle, which provides: 
The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into 
the territory of any other contracting party shall not be subject, 
directly or indirectly, to internal taxes or other internal charges of 
any kind in excess of those applied, directly or indirectly, to like 
domestic products. Moreover, no contracting party shall otherwise 
apply internal taxes or other internal charges to imported or domes-
tic products in a manner contrary to the principle set forth in 
paragraph [1(10)].320 
nation obligations." [d. In addition, although the GATT embodies a strong statement of the uncondi-
tional most-favored-nation principle in Article I, paragraph I, several other provisions qualify the 
principle. Hufbauer, Erb & Starr, supra note 309, at 63-64. Among the provisions qualifying the 
principle are Article XXV, which provides for the waiver of GATT obligations "in exceptional circum-
stances;" Articles XX and XXI, the general and security exceptions; and, Article XIV, which provides 
exceptions to the rule of non-discrimination. [d. at 64. 
314. See J. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAw OF GATT 249-72 (1969) [hereinafter cited as 
JACKSON]. 
315. [d. 
316. /d. at 258. 
317. [d. at 273. 
318. Note, United States Participation in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 61 COLUM. L. REv. 
505, 547 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Unif£d Staf£s Participation]. 
319. [d. 
320. GATT, supra note 306, art. llI(2). Article 1(10) of GATT provides as follows: 
The contracting parties recognize that internal taxes and other internal charges, and laws, 
regulations and requirements affecting the internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transpor-
tation, distribution or use of products, and internal quantitative regulations requiring the 
mixture, processing or use of products in specified amounts or proportions, should not be 
applied to imported or domestic products so as to afford protection to domestic production. 
[d. art. 1(10). 
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The overall goal of the national treatment principle is to prohibit a nation from 
favoring products of domestic origin over imported like products.321 "National 
treatment" in GATT means that imported goods should receive the same treat-
ment as goods of local origin with respect to matters under government control, 
such as regulation and taxation.322 This provision recognizes that the imposition 
of internal taxes is discriminatory under GATT, 323 in this regard, and possibly 
violative of the most-favored-nation principle set forth in Article I (l). 
U.S. courts have frequently considered the issue of discriminatory tax with 
respect to GATT obligations. In Chi1Ul Liquor Distribution Co. v. United States, 324 
the court examined the taxation scheme for imported and domestic distilled 
spirits. By law, the government taxes spirits entered or withdrawn above proof, 
i.e., over fifty percent alcohol, on the volume the spirits would have if diluted to 
fifty percent, while those spirits entered or withdrawn under proof, are taxed on 
the actual volume.325 Domestic distillers pay the tax on their product at or above 
321. JACKSON, supra note 314, at 273. Note, State Buy-American Laws - Invalidity of State Attempts to 
Favor American Producers, 64 MINN. L. REv. 389, 392-93 (1980) [hereinafter cited as State Buy-American 
Laws). Article 111(4) of GATT further provides that: 
The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of any 
other contracting party shall be accorded treatment no less favorable than that accorded to like 
products of national origin in respect of all laws, regulations and requirements affecting their 
internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use. 
GATT, supra note 306, art. 111(4). 
322. Id. 
323. A tax can be either discriminatory on its face or indirectly discriminatory because it results in 
the discouragement of exports. United States Participation, supra note 318, at 548. Although a literal 
reading of Article III might suggest that any tax having a protective effect upon domestic goods would 
violate the Agreement, in practice the proposition that a tax non-discriminatory on its face is violative of 
the Agreement has not been supported by the contracting parties. Id. Rather, the parties involved in 
such a situation usually negotiate their differences, striving to accommodate the most crucial interests of 
each.Id. But see R. HUDEC, THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM AND WORLD TRADE DIPLOMACY 1l0-20 (1975) 
[hereinafter cited as HUDEC). Hudec points out that "[t)he major trading countries had long considered 
the widespread use of discriminatory internal taxes to be a particularly serious breach of good commer-
cial policy and one of their major goals in the GA TT/ITO negotiations had been a strong 'national 
treatment' provision prohibiting such discrimination absolutely." Id. at 113. Hudec describes the 
Franco-Brazilian dispute over a Brazilian tax law which required the tax on imported goods to be 
double the tax for domestic goods. Id. at III. Brazil argued that the law did not violate Article III for 
two reasons. First, under the Protocol of Provisional Application, Oct. 30,1947,61 Stat. All, T.I.A.S. 
No. 1700,55 V.N.T.S. 194, through which GATT is applied, one provision granted a reservation from 
GATT obligations for existing legislation. Brazil argued that since its passing of the tax law in 1945, the 
reservation applied, and therefore, the tax was not violative of Article III. HUDEC, supra, at Ill. 
Secondly, Brazil argued that even if the reservation did not apply, the tax law could not be violative of 
Article III unless France could show some actual trade damage as a result.Id. Brazil inevitably lost both 
of these arguments, as Hudec points out, since the major trading countries were not about to undercut 
the strong "national treatment" provision of Article III through "liberal interpretation of the Protocol, 
or through a trade damage requirement that would make the law uncertain in every case." Id. Although 
the complaint arose in 1949, Brazil did not adopt a uniform taxation system until November, 1957.Id. 
at 120. 
324. 343 F.2d 1005 (C.C.P.A. 1964), cert. denied, 380 V.S. 962 (1965). 
325. Id. at 1006. The relevant tax law was I.R.C. § 5001(a) (1954). 
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proof, add water and bottle thereafter. Importers, however, can only minimize 
the tax if they bottle after importation, which not all are able or willing to do. 
The court, in holding that the tax did not contravene the provisions of GATT, 
relied heavily on the earlier customs court decision in Bercut-Vandervoort & Co., 
Inc. v. United States. 326 Bercut involved the almost identical issue. In this case, the 
customs court concluded that the tax did not violate GATT, because the tax had 
been long established and had also consistently and uniformly been applied.327 
In Select Tire Salvage Co. v. United States, 328 the Court of Claims took judicial note 
of the China Liquor case, noting that "GATT could not have been intended to 
demand the impossible task of eliminating even inadvertent and de minimis 
discriminations."329 An analysis of the Bercut and China Liquor cases shows that the 
decisions were unacceptable "under any reasonable interpretation of Article 
II 1."330 The decisions overlooked the existence of the word "indirectly" in Article 
III, "which seems designed to cover the exact situation presented in the Bercut-
Vandervoort [and China Liquor cases]; one in which the internal tax, although 
non-discriminatory on its face, forces the importer either to forego certain 
advantages that accrue from foreign production, in this case bottling abroad, or 
be subject to a higher impost."331 
The tax in the Bercut and China Liquor cases was not discriminatory on its face 
and was, therefore, perhaps less invidious and easier to uphold than a facially 
discriminatory tax. However, a state sales tax which taxes imported gold coin and 
bullion sales while exempting gold medallions struck by the U.S. Treasury under 
the American Arts Gold Medallion Act332 or other laws would clearly violate the 
national treatment principle of GATT.333 
The U.S. government specifically offers gold medallions for sale in order to 
compete with Krugerrands issued by the Government of South Africa and other 
foreign gold in various forms. 334 The medallions struck under authority of the 
Act in the coining department of the Philadelphia mint are in two sizes: one-half 
ounce and one ounce of troy gold.335 The requisite fineness is nine parts of fine 
gold to one part of alloy.336 The medallions bear the imprint of a sovereign 
nation, the United States of America. Criminal penalties under U.S. law protect 
326. 46 C.C.P.A. 28, cert. denied, 359 U.S. 953 (1959). 
327. Id. 
328. 386 F.2d 1008 (C.C.P.A. 1967). 
329. Id. at 1013. 
330. United States Participation, supra note 318, at 550. 
331. Id. at 550-51. 
332. American Arts Gold Medallion Act, Pub. L. No. 95-630, § 402, 92 Stat. 3679 (1978). 
333. Such a situation would be directly analogous to the Franco-Brazilian situation described by 
Hudec above. See note 316 supra. 
334. See note 204 supra. 
335. American Arts Gold Medallion Act, Pub. L. No. 95-630, §§ 403(a)-404, 92 Stat. 3679 (1978). 
336. Id. 
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the medallions from counterfeiting.337 Representatives of the U.S. Treasury 
opposed the Act permitting this minting because they thought that Americans 
would use the medallions as legal tender.338 The Treasury sells these coins 
competitively with other gold coins, such as the Krugerrand, the Canadian 
Maple Leaf and the Mexican Gold Peso - each of which bears the imprint of a 
sovereign nation. 
Dissimilarities exist among the medallions and bullion339 and Krugerrands.340 
An argument that the medallions and the Krugerrands are not "like products," 
within the ambit of Article III(2) might be reasonable. However, such an argu-
ment would not be persuasive for several reasons. First, given the special 
nature of gold, buyers are primarily interested in the value of the gold itself, not 
its markings. The basis for determining the price of all gold, whether finished or 
unfinished, a medallion or a Krugerrand, is the fair market value of the gold, 
which the market determines solely by the weight and fineness of the gold. The 
medallions, therefore, must be "like products" since any of the differences are 
immaterial. Second, "the major trading nations regard the imposition of inter-
nal taxes to be a particularly serious breach of good commercial policy."341 The 
policy against discriminatory taxes would certainly outweigh the argument that 
the medallions were not like products, in light of the weaknesses in that argu-
ment. 342 
Finally, and most importantly, the medallions are directly competitive with 
Krugerrands, other gold coins, wafers and bullion on the gold market. The 
interpretation of Article III positively includes within its scope "competitive and 
substitutable products."343 In fact, the original text of the Article contained the 
language: 
[I]n cases in which there is no substantial domestic production of like 
products of national origin, no contracting party shall apply new or 
increased internal taxes on the products of the territories of other 
contracting parties for the purpose of affording protection to the 
production of directly competitive or substitutable products which 
are not similarly taxed .... 344 
Although the text of the Article eliminated this language when the 1948 
amendments became effective, GATT members added Interpretive Note No. 
337. Id. § 405. 
338. See Senate Hearings, supra note 204, at 25. 
339. The medallions are a finished product while bullion is unfinished. 
340. The Krugerrands, unlike the Medallions, can be used for currency. See note 66 and accompany-
ing text supra. 
341. HUDEC, supra note 323, at 113. 
342. See note 323 and accompanying text supra. 
343. HYDER, supra note 311, at 133. 
344. GATT, Final Act, Geneva, art. III(I), 55 V.N.T.S. 204 (1947). 
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19 which preserved the obligation with respect to "directly competitive or sub-
stitutable products."345 The liberalized trade objectives of GATT bolster this 
argument. An interpretation of the national treatment principle in Article III 
should be liberal in order to be faithful to both the letter and the spirit of 
GATT.346 
C. The General Exception of Article XX of GATT 
GATT contains a general exception which at first may seem to validate a state 
sales tax on imported gold coin and bullion. Article XX provides: 
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a 
manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, 
or a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this Agree-
ment shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any 
contracting party of measures: 347 
(c) relating to the importation or exportation of gold or silver. ... 348 
The purpose of Article XX is to provide an exception for national govern-
ments which subscribe to GATT and which possess the power to regulate the 
individual monetary system and to regulate foreign commerce.349 A state gov-
ernment, however, cannot rely on this exception. First, a state is not a contract-
ing party of GATT. The terms of the Agreement are binding because of U.S. 
acceptance of GATT by valid executive agreement.350 Second, the U.S. gov-
ernment, not the states, has the specific authority to regulate the monetary 
system.35 ! Third, a state has little or no power to regulate foreign commerce.352 
345. Protocol Modifying Part II and Article XXVI of the GATT, Dec. 14, 1948,62 V.N.T.S. 80. 
JACKSON, sufrra note 314, at 282. 
346. [d. at 264. "But most broad is the concept of 'competing' product. . . invoked by the Interpre-
tive Note to paragraph 2 of Article IlL" [d. 
347. GATT ,sufrra note 306, art. XX (emphasis added). In effect, this clause contains a modified form 
of both the most-favored-nation obligation and the national treatment obligation. JACKSON, sUfrra note 
314, at 143. The MFN clause prohibits discrimination among countries, whereas this clause prohibits 
"arbitrary unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions [exist]." [d. at 143 
n.1. The national treatment obligation prohibits discrimination aga~nst imported goods. [d. at 143 
n.2. All import restrictions favor domestic goods to some extent, but Article XX requires that those 
restrictions falling within the exceptions of that Article avoid being "a disguised restriction on interna-
tional trade." [d. 
348. GATT, sufrra note 306, art. XX (emphasis added). 
349. See generally JACKSON, sUfrra note 314. 
350. See generally jackson, The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in the United States Domestic Law, 
66 MICH. L. REv. 249 (1967) [hereinafter cited as GATT in Domestic Law]. 
351. V.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, c1. 5. 
352. See State Buy-American Laws, sufrra note 321, at 399-406. See also § III sufrra. 
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D. The Right to Invoke GATT Against a State Tax 
On October 30, 1947, President Truman entered the United States into 
GATT under an executive agreement.353 Injustifying U.S. adherence to GATT, 
the executive branch relies on the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act354 and the 
constitutional authority of the president to conduct foreign affairs. 355 As a 
matter of domestic and international law, an executive agreement is equivalent 
to a treaty when such an agreement binds the Nation.356 Courts equate the legal 
significance of GATT to that of a valid treaty,357 and thus conclude that GATT 
is, under the federal constitution, "the Supreme Law of the Land."358 
Article XXIV(l2) of GATT provides that "each contracting party shall take 
such reasonable measures as may be available to it to ensure observance of the 
provisions of this Agreement by the regional and local governments and au-
thorities within its territory."359 Courts have interpreted this Article to mean that 
parties to the action can invoke GATT as a matter of law in any state proceeding 
involving state law. 360 Further, courts generally have concluded that GATT 
applies to and overrides state or territoriallaw.361 A state law must yield when it 
353. GATT in Domestic Law, supra note 350, at 253. 
354. The Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act as amended and extended for three years in 1945, 
contains the basic congressional delegation of power which the President relied upon in accepting 
GATT. Pub. L. No. 70-130, 59 Stat. 410 (1945) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1351 (1976». GATT in Domestic 
Law, supra note 350, at 255. 
355. U.S. CoNST. art. V, § 2. See GATT in Domestic Law, supra note 350, at 274. 
356. Under the U.S. Constitution, the federal government can establish international treaty obliga-
tions in three ways: (1) an agreement negotiated by the President, with the advice and consent by a 2/3 
vote in the Senate; (2) an executive agreement of the President, acting under authority delegated by an 
act of Congress; and (3) an executive agreement of the President, acting under his constitutional power 
to conduct foreign affairs. McDougal & Lans, Treaties aruJ Congressional-ExecuJive Presidential Agreements: 
Interchangeable Instruments of National Policy (pts. I & 2), 54 YALE L.]. 181,534 (1945) [hereinafter cited as 
McDougal & Lans]. 
357. United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 24 (1937). United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942). 
358. U.S. CoNST. art. VI, d. 2. See K.S.B. Technical Sales Corp. v. North Jersey Dist. Water Supply 
Comm'n, 75 N.J. 272, 381 A.2d 774, 778 (1977), appeal dismissed, 45 U.S. 982 (1978). See generally 
McDougal & Lans, supra note 356. 
359. GATT, supra note 306, art. XXIV(12). 
360. KSB Technical Sales Corp. v. North Jersey Dist. Water Supply Comm'n, 75 N.]. at 280-81, 381 
A.2d at 778. 
361. Id. (court held that GATT would supersede conflicting state law; in this particular instance no 
conflict was found); Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Corp. v. Superior Court, 201 Cal. App. 2d 803, 817-20, 25 
Cal. Rptr. 798, 808-09 (1962) (court held California Buy America statute to be superseded by GATT 
and FCN Treaty with Japan); Pacific Meat Co. v. Otagaki, 47 Hawaii 652, 660-61 & n.7, 394 P.2d 618, 
623 & n.7 (1964) (court held state statute governing poultry labelling to be consistent with GATT by 
implication); Territory v. Ho, 41 Hawaii 565, 567-72 (1957) (court held state statute regulating chicken 
imports to be invalid because of conflict with GATT). But see American Inst. for Imported Steel, Inc. v. 
County of Erie, 58 Mise. 2d 1059, 1064,297 N.Y.S. 2d 602, 607 (Sup. Ct. 1968) (court upheld a county 
Buy America resolution on the ground, among others, that GATT does not in and of itself supersede 
local legislation), modified, 32 App. Div. 2d 231, 302 N.Y.S. 2d 61 (1969) (court left lower court's finding 
on GATT unexamined).Cj. Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Board ofComm'rs, 276 Cal. App. 2d 221, 226-27 
& n.9, 80 Cal. Rptr. 800, 803-04 & n.9 (1969) (court held California Buy American Act unconstitutional 
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is inconsistent with or im pairs the policy or provisions of a treaty. 362 Since GATT 
is a treaty, the articles of GATT must prevail over conflicting state law. 
The Supreme Court of New Jersey recognized this principle in K.S.B. Techni-
cal Sales Corporation v. North Jersey District Water Supply Commission. 363 The case 
involved a New Jersey Buy-American statute in a bid solicitation by the state for 
water pumping equipment. The court's analysis rested on treating GATT as a 
valid executive agreement that overrides state law. Although the Buy-American 
condition in the bidding specifications appeared on its face to conflict with the 
national treatment principle of Article 111(4), the court concluded that the 
procurement of the pumps fell within the government procurement exception 
of paragraph (8) of Article III of GATT.364 Because of the Article III exception, 
GATT did not preempt statejurisdiction.365 Since no GATT exception applies 
to state taxation of gold coin and bullion, GATT must, therefore, override state 
law on this issue. 
E. Conflicting State Law Must Yield 
GATT supersedes the application of state law due to its classification as a 
treaty under U.S. law. 366 Thus, a state cannot impose a sales tax on imported 
gold without first considering the legal implications of such a tax under the 
provisions of GATT. A state sales tax would violate the most-favored-nation 
principle of Article I and the national treatment principle of Article III because 
of the discriminatory treatment of imported gold coins under such a tax.367 Not 
only would the tax favor domestic goods, but it may provide dissimilar treatment 
amongst "like products" from foreign markets.36s In addition, a state sales tax 
would not qualify for the Article XX exception because the U.S. government, not 
the state government is responsible for the regulation of gold imports.369 Due to 
the legal position of GATT in U.S. law, conflicting state law must yield to GATT 
rules. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The U.S. Government has the power to regulate the value of coin and cur-
rency, U.S. or foreign, in this country and wherever the U.S. Constitution 
as conflicting with federal power to conduct foreign trade policy; the court did not decide on the alleged 
violation of GATT and expressly refused to rule on the effect of GATT). 
362. See note 361 supra. 
363. 75 N.]. 272, 381 A.2d 774 (1977), appeal dismissed, 435 U.S. 982 (1978). 
364. Id. 
365. Id. at 289-90, 381 A.2d at 782. 
366. See § III.n supra. 
367. See §§ lILA, B supra. 
368. See id. 
369. See § II I.e supra. 
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applies overseas. This constitutional authority applies to foreign gold coins. It 
also applies to bullion, whether or not it is legal tender in the United States or 
elsewhere. States cannot assess sales taxes on gold coin and bullion because the 
monetary and foreign commerce clauses of the U.S. Constitution give the U.S. 
government the sovereign power to regulate the value of money, including gold 
coin and bullion, and to conduct foreign commerce. No act or omission of the 
U.S. government has given this power to the states. 
States which seek to assess sales taxes on gold coin and bullion transactions are 
interfering with federal authority intended to promote monetary uniformity and 
international harmony. State sales taxes on foreign legal tender gold coins, other 
gold coins or bullion would give rise to two dangers: (1) discriminatory taxation 
within a state; and (2) multiple and differing taxations among states. Individual 
state taxation of gold coin and bullion could result in disputes among states or 
nations. With respect to money, including gold coin and bullion, the U.S. Con-
stitution provides a means to avoid these dangers by giving the federal govern-
ment exclusive power in this area. 
